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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE
Today's telecommunications managers are required to have
an overall systems understanding in order to direct
processes effectively. Though it becomes easy to narrow
one's viewpoint to those areas of immediate concern, this
perspective inhibits influential management of the total
operation. representative of this problem are those Defense
Communications Agency (DCA) assets comprising the Defense
Communications System (DCS) which are integrated into the
Naval Telecommunications System (NTS). Systems such as
AUTODIN and AOTOVON, which are segmented under various
organizations, need to be considered as a whole for manage-
ment purposes. These systems are often viewed in pieces by
managers, with little thought given to those portions not
falling under their direct control. There is a lack of
understanding regarding how actions on one section effects
the rest or what influences the system as an aggregate.
The reasons for such a disassocia tion from the whole are
varied. In part it is due to the segregation of responsi-
bility and management authority. The parochialism which
enters into the budgeting process adds its influence. The
incentives imbedded into current rate development processes
and pricing policies are also involved. This thesis will
attempt to address such issues by looking at the management
questions surrounding DCA leased resources. Specifically,
the means of payment through the Communications Services
Industrial Fund (C5IF) will be examined in the context of
its influence on the management of various backbone portions
of the DCS.
B. REVOLVING FOHDS
The Communications Services Industrial Fund is one of a
group of Department of Defense (DOD) funds which are
referred to as revolving, industrial or working-capital
funds. Five industrial funds have been established within
the DOD [Ref. 1: pp. H3-H4] :
£.01 I nd ustrial Fund - principally depot supply, mainte-
nance, and research activities; the Military Traffic
Management and Terminal Service is the largest activity
within the fund.
H^ZX Industrial Fund - the largest of the DOD ^industrial
funds. The Navy Industrial Fund includes the majority of
Navy's rework facilities such as shipyards, air rework and
ordnance facilities, public work centers, research facili-
ties and the Military Sealift Command.
Marine Corjss Industrial "Fund - the smallest of the DOD
industrial funds; finances equipment, maintenance depots
and technical engineering support.
Air Force Industrial F und - includes depot maintenance of
aircraft and the Military Airlift Command.
Defense Industrial Fund - consists of the Defense Clothing
and Textile Center and the Communications Services
Industrial Fund.
The DOD is not the only federal agency which uses the
concept of the industrial fund- Almost all agencies employ
them for funding of centralized administrative services such
as communications, photography, automatic data processing
(ADP) , library and duplicating. The General Services
Administration finances Federal buildings, general supplies,
Federal telecommunications, and ADP through revolving funds
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in addition to administrative functions. The Food and Drug
Administration uses a revolving fund for the services it
provides on a reimbursable basis to industry.
As can be seen, a variety of activities are funded
through this device. The designation of areas which are to
fall under industrial funds is left to the services or agen-
cies involved, however approval is required from the
Secretary of Defense level. Any industrial or commercial-
type activities that provide common services within or among
the departments and agencies of the DOD are eligible. The
requirement also exists for a buyer-seller or a contractual
relationship between the provider of the services and the
activity receiving such services.
All industrial funds receive initial capitilization from
Congress by way of a corpus. From this point the fund
survives by rotating funds from the corpus to the suppliers,
then billing the customers to replenish the corpus. Hence
the name revolving. The objective is not profit but
achieving zero surplus or loss. More specifically, the
industrial fund activity receives a work request from a
customer. The work is performed either by the activity
itself or through contracting out. Corpus money is used to
pay the bills. The fund is then reimbursed by billing the
requesting activity.
The CSIF was established as a means of funding all
leased communications assets for the DOD, to include private
line communications services, communications equipment and
facilities. It operates as do all other of the funds in
general. It is managed by DCA with a corpus currently
funded at $20 million. Two divisions of DCA are essentially
involved: the CSIF division and the Defense Commercial
Communications Office (DECCO) . Both will be discussed in
later chapters, however, a brief description of fund opera-
tions is included here for introductory purposes.
1 1
DECCO is responsible for leasing all required communica-
tions assets for DOD and authorized non-DOD agencies. The
customer provides DECCO with a request for services. After
evaluation, DECCO orders the communications from commercial
companies. The company provides the services to the
customer but bills DECCO. DECCO then pays the company and
bills the customer. The customer paying DECC3 replenishes
the corpus, completing the cycle. The customer is billed at
predetermined rates determined by the CSIF division.
There are numerous reasons for the introduction of
industrial funding concepts into the DOD. These will be
discussed in detail in later sections. Whatever the
reasons, industrial funds are not a small business. In
fiscal year 1975 over 100 Defense activities were operating
under industrial funds, employing approximately 37,000 mili-
tary personnel and 298,000 civilians (about 27% of the DOD
civilian workforce). Sales were nearly $9.9 billion,
ranking the industrial fund complex equal with U.S. Steel,
the 1Uth largest industrial corporation. [ Eef . 2: p. 2] The
DOD budget for fiscal year 1975 called for an outlay of
$87.9 billion, $24 billion of which was to be spent through
working capital funds [Ref. 3: p. 16]. In fiscal year 1984,
civilian employees involved with industrially funded activi-
ties accounted for 29? of the DOD civilian work force and
expected sales approximated $24 billion [Ref. 4: p. 1].
The CSIE funds over 15 million miles of leased
circuitry, dealing with over 300 commercial companies
(domestic, international and foreign). Over 8 0,000
contracts are administered monthly. The annual cost of
leasing services for fiscal year 1985 is projected to exceed
$1 billion. [Ref. 3: p. 8 ]
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C. QUESTIONS FOR THE MANAGES
From the foregoing it can be seen that tha CSIF is not
an inconsequential element in military communications and
therefore an understanding of how it works could prove bene-
ficial to the manager. Knowledge of the mechanics of its
operations however is not sufficient for understanding its
importance. Other questions that should be kept in mind
throughout are listed below as an aid in looking at the CSIF
from the standpoint of the system as a whole and the effect
it has on the management of that system.
(1) What are the problems associated with the CSIF and
what effect do those problems have on the manager and
the system.
(2) What effect do the budgetary procedures have on the
fund, the manager and the system.
(3) Do current practices allow for effective management of
the DCS and if not what changes are needed?
(4) Do the standard rates currently used for distributing
costs result in allocative efficiency * and if not
what effect, if any, has this had on system
architecture.
(5) What effect will proposed changes to the fund have on
the system, and user behavior.
Many other questions could be outlined at this point,
however, the underlying theme of all would be the same,
what influences do various factors associated with the CSIF
have on the system, the manager, and user behavior?
1 Allocative efficiency is defined for the purpose of
this thesis as distributing costs in such a way that the
incentive structure created induces users to behave as
desired. In terms of the DCS, DCA is concerned with using
pricing policies of the CSIF to influence customers in a
manner beneficial to system characteristics such as
capacity, congestion and optimum mix of lines.
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D. SCOPE
This thesis will address those questions raised in
Section C as well as provide an in-depth look at how the
fund works. A brief preview of each chapter is provided
below :
Chapter II - outlines the history of the CSIF including
why it was established and what it was hoped it would
accomplish. A description of the two main DCA divisions
involved, CSIF division and DECCO, is included as well as
an analysis of the mechanics of the fund, assets covered,
customers serviced and suppliers used.
Chapter III - provides an in-depth review of budgetary and
rate development procedures.
Cha pter IV - analyzes the efficiency of the fund and
delves into how the fund has influenced user behavior and
system architecture to date. A number of issues effecting
proper management of the DCS are also discussed.
Chapter V - discusses proposed changes to the fund. The
perceived need for such changes is examined and the hoped
for consequences are discussed.
Ch apter VI - provides conclusions and recommendations to
issues discussed throughout the thesis.
1U
II- HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE CSIF
A. INITIAL ESTABLISHHENT OF INDUSTRIAL FDNDS
The oldest existing working-capital fund is the Navy
Stock Fund. Prior to 1878, all supply inventories were
maintained and distributed on a free issue basis. In that
year an annually appropropriat ed revolving fund was created
as an attempt at better management by requiring customers to
budget for needed supplies. Five years later the Navy
Supply Fund Act was passed with the following description
[Ref. 1: p. G3 ] :
"And the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized
and directed to cause the general account to be charged
with the sum of two hundred thousand dollars, which
amount shall be carried to the credit of a permanent
naval supply fund to be used under the direction of the
Secretary of the Navy in the purchase of ordinary
commercial supplies for the naval service, and to be
reimbursed from the proper naval appropriations whenever
the supplies purchased under said fund are issued for
use."
With this, the basic attributes of industrial funds were
initiated. A corpus was to be set from which payments were
male to suppliers and reimbursements aade by customers, from
money budgeted and appropriated for that purpose.
No other use was made of this concept until 1949 when
the Defense Industrial Funds were established through amend-
ment of the National Security Act of 1947. The Act itself
created the Department of Defense. Provisions of Title 10,
United States Code, Section 2208 authorized the Secretary of
Defense to require establishment of working capital funds in
the DOD to provide working capital for such industrial-type
and commercial-type activities as provide common services
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within or among the Departments and Agencies of the DOD, as
the Secretary may designate. [Ref. 5: p. 1-1]
Prior to 1949 almost all projects or budget programs
were financed from numerous appropriations. Appropriations
were managed by widely disbursed and unrelated organiza-
tional divisions having varying degrees of operational
responsibility. Some activities received money from as many
as 200 or more separate allotments. The Comptroller General
reported that at one point over 10,000 allotments or admin-
istrative subdivisions had been established at one installa-
tion. [Ref. 2: p. 13]- Goods produced and services
rendered were provided free to Defense customers.
The result of this was that little attention was paid to
cost by the managers and users felt few financial
constraints for placing orders. Accounting systems were
concerned with keeping track of obligations and disburse-
ments for each appropriation or allotment and insuring that
individual funding limits for each expense category were not
exceeded. Cost accounting systems were limited, making it
difficult to relate costs to end products or projects. The
Comptroller General reported that [Ref. 2: p. 13] :
"...it becomes increasingly more obvious that the exces-
sive use of detailed administrative allotments as the
basis for administering programs under appropriated
funds is a significant factor in the confused and unsa-
tisfactory situation with respect to financial control
in the Department of Defense."
In a similar vein, Herbert Hoover, as Chairman of the Hoover
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee in April 1949 that [Ref. 2: p. 14] :
"The budgetary and appropriation structures in the Army
and Navy are antiguated. They respresent an accumula-
tion of categories arrived at on an empirical and
historical basis. They do not permit ready comparisons,
they impede administration, and interfere with the effi-
ciency of the military establishments."
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The cure for these problems was seen in consolidating
industrial and com mercial- type activities of a similar
nature under the industrial fund concept, in order to bring
commercial business practices into the military setting
without the duplication of efforts that would result if
accounting procedures were simply overhauled at each indi-
vidual activity. Accounting practices were also not the
only area of concern, but were coupled with the desire to
promote more efficient operations. Industrial funds were
intended to incorporate three important features to
encourage better management and create an environment
similar to that of private industry [Ref. 2: p. 10] :
(1) Businesslike cost accounting would be use! which would
focus attention on the cost of getting the job done,
simplify budgeting, and provide cost information for
management control.
(2) A revolving fund, relatively free from the appropria-
tion cycle with its established spending limitations,
would give management the financial authority and
flexibility to adjust operations for changes in work-
load and achieve efficiencies and cut cost.
(3) A buyer-seller relationship would be established
between customers and producers, forcing customers to
pay for what they receive and making producers finan-
cially dependent on obtaining orders from customers
and matching costs with reimbursements to remain
solvent.
Reference 5 lists the following objectives industrial
funds were designed to meet [Ref. 5: pp. 1-1,1-2] :
a. Provide a more effective means for controlling the
costs of goods and services required to be produced or
funished by industrial- and commercial-type
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activities, and a more effective and flexible means
for financing, budgeting, and accounting for the costs
thereof.
b. Create and recognize contractual relationships between
industrial- and commercial-type activities and those
activities that budget for and order the end-products
or services, in order to provide management advantages
and incentives for efficiency.
c. Provide to managers of industrial- and commercial-type
activities the financial authority and flexibility
required to procure and use manpower, material, and
other resources effectively.
d. Encourage more cross -servicing among the DOD
Components and among their operating agencies, with
the aim of obtaining more economical use of
facilities.
e. Facilitate budgeting for and reporting of the costs of
end- prod acts. This will underline the cost conse-
quences of choosing between alternatives.
f. To furnish managers of industrial- and commercial-type
activities with modern management tools comparable to
those utilized by efficient private enterprises
engaged in similar types of activities.
g. To improve cost estimating and cost control by using
the constraints of a formal contractual relationship
and the requiremnt for the comparison of estimates and
actual costs.
h. To obtain alert, forward-looking financial planning at
industrial-and commercial-type activities by making
them financially dependent on reimbursements received
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for goods and services furnished in fulfilling orders
from customers.
i. To encourage producers of goods and services to coor-
dinate labor forces and inventories with workload,
budgeting, and cost control.
j. To instill in the officials of ordering agencies a
greater sense of responsibility and self-restraint in
limiting their orders and in balancing the cost of
specific goods and services to be orderei against the
benefits and advantages of their procurement, espe-
cially in the light of alternative or competing
demands.
k. To place ordering agencies in the position of critic
of purchase prices, as well as guality and delivery-
speed of the goods and services ordered.
1. To enable ordering agencies to budget and account on
an "end-product" basis (the same as when buying from
commercial contractors) , simplifying budget presenta-
tions, budgetary control, and accounting procedures
for both producers and ordering agencies.
m. To establish, whenever feasible, stabilized rates and
unit prices for goods and services furnished by indus-
trial fund activities, thus enabling ordering agencies
to plan and budget more confidently.
n. To encourage ordering agencies' management to improve
program planning and sceduling in response to produc-
ers' efforts to plan and negotiate for orders as far
in advance as feasible.
The concept of industrial funds envisioned by Congress
and their intent in authorizing them can be summarized by
19
the following excerpts from Senate Report No. 366 (May 12
,
1949, on S. 1832). [Bef. 6: pp. 13-14]
"A report of the Naval Affairs Committee of the
House in 1945 pointed out the lack, of adequate cost
accounting in this type of activity. It stressed the
necessity for developing some means for ascertaining the
cost of work performed. In administrating appropriated
funds, the contemporary allotment type of control direct
from appropriations can be developed to a satisfactory
point in administrative or strictly military type func-
tions. However, such an administrative type of manage-
ment and financial control fails utterly in contributing
to the proper management of industrial and commercial
type activities, and, without complete duplication of
cost systems, cannot provide information as to the cost
of work performed. The problem can be solved in a
manner that fits into the framework of the performance
type budget. An operating or working capital fund can
be established for the operations of such activities-
eliminating entirely the many sources of funds now used
to finance their day to day operations. In effect,
working capital would be available to those who actually
run or administer any industrial type or commercial type
activity performing common services— making those ofn-
cials fully responsible for a direct accounting for the
money they spend, the costing of each job, and the most
economical method of accomplishing tne work. All costs
of the operation of this industrial type or commercial
type activity would be paid from the working capital
fund, using standard, accepted, and approved commercial
practices for the distribution of direct and indirect
costs of jobs in process. The activity which places a
work order. ... would establish proper commitments and
obligations against money appropriated to it— generally
in the same manner as would be followed if this order
were placed for the work to be done by a private
concern. The industrial plant would enter the order and
distribute the work in the plant by its own job orders--
fundamentally sound procedure. Wnen the work is
completed aaa the cost of the job ascertained, the plant
will invoice or bill the cost to the ordering military
agency. ..."
"Accounting and reporting systems would be simpli-
fied and the cost of work performed would become charge-
able directly to the budget program as it was presented
and justified before the Congress. The amount of work
performed in such industrial type and commercial type
activities under the working capital concept would be
directly controlled by orders placed within the limits
of money appropriated foe such work. Subsection 405(a)
of Security Acts Amendments, 1949. contains language
which would authorize and direct the Secretary of
Defense immediately to begin this major needed improve-




B, THE BEGIXHIHG OF THE CSIF
In 1949, the four services' industrial funds were initi-
ated. Evolution of the communication systems and policies
within the DOD were required, however, before the need for
the CSIF was realized. Prior to 1957, there was no consoli-
dation of effort in the area of communication services.
Every agency within the DOD was responsible for leasing its
own assets to fulfill various needs, resulting in extensive
duplication of effort and inefficient cost results due to
the inability to take advantage of large scale buying.
The idea of a central organization whose purpose was to
perform all leasing functions within the DOD began in 1957
with the activation of the Air Force's Air Defense Command
Section to deal with all leasing and management elements of
communications for the SAGE (Semi- Automatic Ground
Environment) System. This first attempt at a consolidation
of efforts proved successful with unit costs going down and
efficiency up. The activity was expanded to become the
single focal point for leased communications within the Air
Force. In 1961, it was given tha management of the TELPAK
TARIFF by DOD and subsequently incorporated as the central
control point for leased communications within DOD, with a
name change to Office of Commercial Communications
Management (OCCM). Two years later, on 1 January 1963, OCCM
became a field activity of DCA designated as the Defense
Commercial Communications Office. DECCO was designated by
the Secretary of Defense as the sole leasing agent and
manager of private line communications service for the DOD.
Though a centralized organizational system now existed,
no such convergence was evident in the communications
systems themselves. Each military department funded and
maintained its own world-wide long distance communications
networks. In 1963 they consisted of:
STARCOM - Strategic Army Communications System
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NAVCOMSYS - Naval Communications System
&IRCOM - Air Force Communications System
These separate systems created undesirable duplications and
in many cases did not include the standards of reliability,
survivability and speeds required for national command
authorities.
In 1963, the Secretary of Defense approved a concept to
implement two world-wide automatic switched systems in order
to create a common backbone network within the DCS, AUTOVON
was formed in 1964 by linking together the Air Force North
American Air Defense Commands Automatic Dial Switching
Network and the Army's Switched Circuit Automatic Network.
AUTODIN was drawn from the former Air Force DATACOH System.
With the integration of leased services underway,
concern was growing over efficient funding control. On May
4 1963, the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the
Director, DCA to conduct a study of alternative methods of
programming, budgeting and funding the various elements of
the DCS. The study concluded as a major point that aser
agencies, to the extent practicable, should pay for services
received. In this way, a cost conscious control could be
exercised over requirements. In addition, it was felt that
elements should be incorporated so that:
(1) costs by function and area could be identified and
examined on a continuous basis.
(2) planned improvements could be given a realistic cost
effectiveness analysis.
(3) funding cutbacks could be examined to better evaluate
the impact.
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(4) the system would be compatible with established
programming, budgeting and financing criteria of the
military departments.
The study concluded that an industrial fund method of
financing the DCS offered the greatest advantage for
centralized control of financial resources. [Ref. 7:
pp. 8-9]
The establishment of the CSIF was approved by the
Secretary of Defense in 1964. With approval of the CSIF
charter in April of 1965, the fund began operations on 1
July 1965. The charter set down the following guidelines
for fund operations [Ref. 8: p. 2] :
"The Defense Communications Agency is authorized
hereby to finance those Department of Defense communica-
tions services as directed by the Secretary of Defense,
including the operations of the Defense Commercial
Communications Office (DECCO) . . . .
"
"Under the management control of the Director,
Defense Communications Agency, the purpose of the
"Communications Services Activity" is to furnish those
communications services, as authorized by the Secretary
of Defense, to Departments and Agencies of the
Department of Defense. As directed or authorized by the
Director, Defense Communications Agency, or higher
authority, the "Communications Services Activity" will
also furnish such communications services to other U.S.
Government Departments and Agencies or other users as
may be appropriate and authorized by law."
"Predetermined subscriber rates will be the basis
for recovering the cost of operating and maintaining the
backbone networks (switches and trunks) and an appli-
cable portion of the cost of operating the Defense
Commercial Communications Office. All costs of access
lines, dedicated or special purpose networks, and any
termination charges will be reimbursed by authorized
users. including an applicable share of the cost for
operating the Defense Commercial Comunications Office.
Subscriber rates. which will be subject to the prior
approval of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller), will be developed, revised as required,





The operations of the CSIF involves extensive interplay
between various components: the CSIF division which falls
under the comptroller directorate of DCA, DECCO, the
customers and numerous commercial companies. General func-
tions of each of the first three are listed below:
lk§L C SIF division is responsible for [fief. 3: p. 2] :
(1) Preparing the CSIF annual program budget estimates and
the operating budget submissions, and preparing finan-
cial management of budget justification reviews to
higher authority.
(2) Developing and publishing planning rates, subscriber
rates and standard rates for leased communications.
They also provide timely programming and budgeting
information necessary for budget submissions to
customer activities.
(3) Approving and publishing DECCO overhead rates.
(4) Negotiating and preparing agreements and reimburse-
ments procedures with the military departments for
costs incurred in the operation and maintenance of
switching centers and other DCS communications facili-
ties to be reimbursed from the CSIF.
(5) Providing overall management and direction of the
CSIF.
CECCC is responsible for [fief. 3: p. 9] :
(1) Performing rate and tariff analysis to insure that the
Federal Government is receiving the best rates and
conditions possible for private line communications
services.
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(2) Maintenance of financial, contractual and operational
data relative to DECCO contracts for leased commercial
communications services.
(3) Design and implementation of accounting, disbursing,
data processing, financing, and management control
systems for the processing and reporting of leased
commercial communications data, leased by DECCO.
(4) Development and provision of pertinent financial,
contractual, and operational data by recurring manage-
ment and financial reports.
Th e customers are responsible for [ Ref . 9: p. ii ] :
(1) Providing the necessary financial and access line data
reguired by DCA for preparation of the CSIF annual
program budget request and operating budget request
and subsequent justification to the Secretary of
Defense and the Office of Management and Budget (OdB)
.
(2) Providing the necessary access line data required for
development by DCA of subscriber rates and planning
rates.
(3) Providing manpower and cost data, with supporting
justification, for the development of Interservice
Support Agreements covering the reimbursement from the
CSIF for operation and maintenance costs at switching
centers and other DCS communications facilities.
D. ASSETS COVEEED
There are two areas of reimbursables covered by the
CSIF. One is the backbone programs. The other is all dedi-
cated and special purpose leased retirements such as access
lines, point-to-point circuits and terminal equipment. The
two major assets funded by the CSIF are the AUTOVON and
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AUTODIN lackbone networks and access lines. The backbone
network refers to the switches and trunks. As of 1 July
1975, DCA is also responsible for the operational management
of the CONDS portion of the ARPANET. The ARPANET backbone
falling under CSIF funding consists of the network Interface
Message Processor s (IMP ' s) and Terminal Interface
Processors (TIP'S) f their interfaces, and the communications
lines connecting them. The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
(PIN) also falls under the CSIP. Both WIN and the military
portion of ARPANET will be incorporated in the Defense Data
Network (DDN), also CSIF funded, when fully established.
The Defense Switched Network (DSN) will be another CSIF
backbone program when operational. The Washington Area
Fideband System (WAWS) is a CSIF program as ths Hawaii Area
Wideband System (HAWS) will be when completed. [ Ref - 3]
On 21 March 1973, the Secretary of Defense assigned the
Director, DCA, the responsibility for centralized engi-
neering and management of all nontactical off-base DOD
multiplex systems. Two types of multiplexing systems are
funded by the CSIF: the voice frequency carrier telegraph
(VFCT) system and the channel packing systems- The last
major asset funded by CSIF are the satellite services.
[Ref. 9: p. U-4]
The chart below shows a breakdown of systems and
projected financing for fiscal year 1983 indicating the
relative weight of each within the CSIF [Ref. 7: p. 6] :
SYSTEMS ($ In Millions)
A0T0VON System (backbone/access lines) 2U2.3
AOTODIN System (backbone/access lines) 90.2
Multiplex Backbone 10.8
Special Purpose Networks 311.7
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The remainder of this thesis will be concerned primarily
with the backbone assets failing within the purview of DCA
and the CSIF. Budget and rate development procedures will
address these specifically, while Chapter IV and V on CSIF
discrepancies and alternatives will concentrate on these
portions with some discussion on government-owned segments.
The reason for this is that the costs of special purpose
networks are billed directly to the users. Therefore, a
number of the issues associated with the backbone network
are not applicable.
E. THE CDSTOflERS
DECCC is responsible for procuring leased communications
services from commercial carriers for all DOD agencies and
authorized non-DOD departments and agencies. Table I
provides a breakdown of ail CSIF customers and revenue
provided by them to the fund during FY83 and FY 84. As has
already been indicated, revenues and leasing costs are
expected to exceed $1 billion in FY 85. [Ret. 10] A more
consolidated picture of how extensively various agencies are
involved is provided by the FY 83 budget estimates listed
below [Ref. 7: p. 6] :
CUSTOMER {$ In Millions)





As will be seen in later chapters, the differences in
dollars is not necessarily a function of the extent the
services and other agencies use the DCS.
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F. THE SUPPLIERS
DECCO and the CSIF maintain contracts with approximately
750 commerical companies and government agencies. Almost
300 of these organizations are individual state or regional
telephone companies such as West Coast Telephone Company of
California, United Telephone Company of Florida and Southern
Bell Telephone Company. Another 50 are government agencies
such as U.S. Information Agency, NASA and the City of St.
Louis. The remaining involvement is with commercial compa-
nies ranging from the well-known such as ATT, GTE,
Burroughs, Western Union, and the UNIVAC Division of Sperry
Rand Corps, to the lesser knowns such as Terminal Unlimited
and U.S. Instruments Rentals.
Foreign companies and organizations play a part as well.
DECCO manages contracts with companies such as SIEMENS and
deals with government agencies including the Royal Canadian
Air Force and the Russian. Telephone Company.
The range is extensive and the intricacies of
contracting and leasing activities within DECCO are beyond
the scope of this thesis. It will suffice to say at this
point that all DOD instructions pertaining to acquisition
apply. [Eef . 11
]
G. GENERAL WORKINGS OF THE CSIF
Figure 2.1 illustrates the general cycle relating all
elements of the fund. [Sef. 3: p. 6] As shown, the rotation
occurs as follows:
(1) Customer requirements are received and evaluated by
DECCO.
(2) DECCO orders the communications services from commer-
cial companies.
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(3) The services are provided by the commercial companies
to the customers.
(4) The commercial companies bill DECCO.
(5) After verification of the bill, the commercial compa-
nies are paid by DECCO from the CSIF corpus.
(6) The customers are then billed monthly by DECCO based
on predetermined subcriber rates.
(7) Accounts receivable are collected from the customers
and returned to the corpus. Customer payments are
drawn from their Operation and Maintenance
appropriations
.
The process itself appears ^uite straightforward. The
complexity enters when addressing the issue of how it is
determined who pays what. Since in most cases it is back-
bone costs that are at issue, a means was needed to spread
these costs over all customers in an efficient manner. As
was stated previously, there are two sides to the CSIF: the
backbone programs and all dedicated and special purpose
leased requirements. Costs for the backbone programs
include initial and recurring costs for operation and main-
tenance of the switched networks. Included are special
equipment and any termination charges. The CSIF is reim-
bursed for these cost through backbone subscriber rates.
For all dedicated and special purpose leased requirements,
the customer is billed for the actual leased cost. DOD
Directive 7410. 4R states that "Industrial funds will be used
to finance the operating costs of major service units that
produce goods and services in response to requirements of
users...." [Ref. 5]. Therefore, the operating costs of
DECCO must also be applied to all customers through the use
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of an overhead rate. This rate, once determined, is
included in the total subscriber rate applied to backbone
costs and is in addition to the actual cost of leasing dedi-
cated and special purpose assets. In essence there are two
types of rates which must be determined by the CSIF divi-
sion: the DECCC overhead rate charged to all subscribers
and subscriber rates for each specific backbone program
applied to the particular customers of that service. For
non-DOD users an additional 0.25% is added to the overhead
charge to cover the cost of military personnel. The money
is collected through the CSIF and reimbursed to the appro-
priate services. [Ref. 3: p. 10]
Prior to fiscal year 1976, rates were adjusted
throughout the year as changing circumstances dictated.
This process required CSIF customer activities to reprogram
funds to meet payments on increased rates. In FY 76, rate
stabilization was implemented to alleviate the negative
effect on customer budgeting and Operation and Maintenance
funds. Once rates are established, they are unchanged for
the appropriate fiscal year. Any necessary adjustments for
bringing the funds profit or loss status to zero are
included in subsequent fiscal year rates. Using stabilized
rates also allows customers to include anticipated cost
escalations iu their budgets. Annual accounts are precluded
from budgeting for inflation, however this does not apply to
subscriber rates. An inflation factor is incorporated into
all planning rates used by the CSIF.
The objectives underlying the determination of
subscriber rates include the following [Ref. 3: p. 14] :
(1) Comply with appropriate DOD regulations
(2) Efficient basis for billing customers
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(3) Flexibility for the Director, DCA to manage switched
network service on a global basis, to maintain the
most cost-effective networks
(4) Marketable to encourage departments where feasible, to
use the switched networks rather than more expensive
special purpose systems
(5) Serve as a management tool to department managers
(6) Fiscal stability to avoid unbudgeted reprogramming
(7) Simple for use in planning, programming, budgeting
(8) Cost effective and feasible to administer
(9) Capability to bill non-D.S. government users for total
cost-- (capital , operating and military personnel)
Chapter IV and V of this thesis will address these
objectives while discussing the effects and problems associ-
ated with current CSIF policies. Some knowledge of rate
development and budget procedures is needed however as a
background to such an analysis. The steps involved in budg-
eting for the CSIF and rate determination are similar for
all backbone programs though each is necessarily distinct
due to unique characteristics of the system. The number of
backbone programs involved prohibits an extensive evaluation
of each, plus the discussion would become repetitive eventu-
ally. Due to the universal nature of the AUTOVON and





no mroco^r *- en «- enoo ld <— r» <n **•m vo ^jx> VO cn COLD'—fN^OiS*
J>© mcNunu-i enr\i r^-vo O^mOvOU^^ztCTir- O r—m r- VO enmr^rvjpotn
co r-'~^ ^O^fT- lDvO r-cn r-voocor*-rsirsj*-' r-> r- n en COOr- CO 1
as % % % » » » % % * * % * •. > * *
*»: «-cnr-»;r Cncn ^TO *- *-LnCN (N CO cnr»







LnCM^-CTi oroo«-T-'"\orN^)nLn(**v03,n'ri3'Ooo r^ in ^-LncocN^r»
1no cncor^co ^o c\)eomcoconoinv£n—oco co CT\ en r»r-mcNcriLn
x>o rnr»ro<N LDv£) vDvO T-=rcrir^vor*rnpn «- o cr CNvOCN











w tj H (d i3 •H
1 1-4 c CD >i M CJ +J CD
1 CQ < V) U w cn res G o
1 ««S C 0J O M H td >iH
1 H (0 CD CD U M CD Cn r-i G U > G
M > CD WH Oj CT> S +J O G M O
0) SmH CD W< > rd W «: •H CD CD-H
a O-P u e m h « 4J CTCO-P
G <d •H >iCD C/J CD (d id * i <d«s idp 0) T> t» UVH-UCO U) OH X >, u g en
w T»H CD M G CD U CD-H CD-P M +J+J OH
3 <<P >iO CD CDQ CD a Ofd-P W M >1 CD CO G-H+J
U CO OH in Cr» -OO-H CD U CD CD u *U •H CD-P 10
10 CD G > 0) >*,>»<m O-H >S CD H Oi G G g a (d cd
a>4)MU(PUU OU+^M n flO CD (d •H 03 N > CD
o g cncD M>fifi(D exi <d cD-n o *o u tn a a m-r-t g u
•hh<:co cd-h <u <p u >^ bcogm -hcu «c a rt3 MiHH'H
p S4-» Cnt7>C MJ3 M (dOircJS o <: (d <d -p
(dH CO CD £3 <d<^ QJ <d U O <d U r-l >~l u CO M4~l to
U <d U O Cn DHJ UM-I-P-C-P <T3 «.<d +J a>r~{ a O 3
CO-H CH OCJ'H Cni-i-H CD <C G <dP G P<N CD •H 13 OOP >"3
co H G-HP.G +J G (diH M (DHQH.HUQK M <U •H (dpH Z3BW U+h C0-H CDt-H UW fd O en 3 •H co+JHs (dm
z W S-H-H CD O CD "*H CD CD <D V3 CDf-JrHCO u H t-t 03 U\CD O
W w sen t^H > CI.U+JC0« CD-HX (d -H i1 rH 55'H M a M3 s HOUO(t4JR«)3C UC CD G H c! to «C W >P O P-P
53 H Q3CJ hlH CHEZHWd M O Cl3 0'H O S<G-HCQG 1
w 03 < CD CD 3) 0-t-> (d-H-H.^C+J H CD EH OP CD
t> *c O.CDt0CDCDBCD<X>CDCD Utnfl'H3+J 1 G CD td a C£rHU IflH E
w Oi HU1CI/H0+J WU1W1/1CI(5 «3rHT3 tdU:<: (/} c CD *$ <d M (dp
OS w cd Q G CD G a ijCCCCOfltl 'HH2D G o M cu M co mu MQU CD^H CD CD (d CD CD CD CD-H > CD G > H Q G CD •H O. W CD S-H CD id
tn m Q4_i cDm'n aiH^HM-m-imra a cd-n o mo (d^n +J 3 Qro m and p-i
o >-• o o cdq cd cd cd cd cd cd cd'h-s: Mtocji^-Hsto oj 03 CO CDrtja CD CD
M Ph QO I QQQOQQCO 1 << 1 1 1 «3 1 1 Q z QCi_, | hPhQ
w <; ?^>i 1 H | | 1 1 I 1 | 1 <C 1 COSOi | «fti | 1 O 1 -< 1 1 1
u h m a > CdrtJCC^COCOC/X'flialCl&ipHQ-alSCQWKS 1 Cl<QC/iHrD
P3 H-H H (d WU^ 1-lHfl!HE2HW«':,:^E h30^<'-1 rt: i <:cj55moD
-q "=« *»: 55 XQQaQOQRQClOrtJH^USazVlQ < u SSbHrtJHMntH
o H H CO < o
to s o 3 CO s
.— J
32
a'fNCOMOnOOtN r^CTe-LOcrOr-PO tNcnrOr- CO r-lDfNl(NJvC(N :3"^0 *"
cn cn*— cm v^rn^t a- u~)^-«— *—a m r- a- r^T- rn a-














or-t^.fN'orocoocN m«-«-o^ ^o cnpopoo oo or^cNCNvors a-oo ^







o a > «*
u n p H
o
W En
w ^ g u; a.
<u a; ^ up
r- s s o e -ho
G Gt3 * . > U n3
I Q) o n^airtj uj >i o p g
I
fH > G Cn p >i U U 0> W <d
I -Q CJ rel^U 3J O 3 COUG -4
I <t)« -H * - OJ .G 53 O Oi
I H G <1> P O G 0; D> Oi 03H-H 3
ts o <tj <d a< o ct> cii(P «: ^ g +j w
I G tHO-3 -H <, 3 O P UO »iDU
| fl 4J O^ nn +J O-H JJJJO T> H-HrH OZG
itHOW>,(U fl G WG M>>ifl+Jfi 0) HPrei-HHO
I W U O U-H 1-10) OGO U P U 0)—LH re) H iflCC fla
I P SflaCH P (-1 -H OH 0) OJaSiSU'H 0) WOOSWCO
<D roG+JOJH UJ OJ 3 >i
-P -HP U >W Q) O.CJ-H'Ora H G-H-H a G O-H
S WrelrtOVC -HO-PU re) +> re)-H P CT»OKn3G3 O GP S 0>H GOH < >-iG-H-H G ro relp > OU'SJ'H 0;h <TJ fO -H 3 A3 O-H 3
P O ^l/l-d 10H.H>31) G O l-l l-l Cfl-H OJ^HSC *a G P a G UP -»
W •^UcJ)U3SuUW>i3 'HOD -H-G-H > O a,3 CO fd re! a P Q) <D 0) -P
3 M-p-H (0 u a; wt3 cy.H<: cno g :oto a; > o.re> a; m 3 o « u o hih o oI'H
U CDrHP CPreKCOP P&-. 3 111 PT3 <fl 3Q <D O OCJ W (U tfMUP 0)-H Gnd
-P ctf 3 U <D !-i (!) CT>G (D S G Cntd<C U CO P H SGWG CHCOltl)
G i; (T3-H G^cO Ul W U<C O G OJ a(T3GP 0>H~3 3X5P 0003MH 34H H
HKCC.H3h(l)ll -HW U O P-HC^ >tH> UP H ^ h^UBD OEDU
O CJH Ui U^G^H-*-1 G UE-^P P G O P-H 03 G-H rn CUJ S U G'H goPm M (yH'OHH'H+J O f0M-l 0) W«-K3(fl.Hfl+JMOH C3 OJ OUO'OO ^H
oo^uaj(T3o>f0 a o-ri'o dim m o+j (wa v n^ w w cjrprau o-h acjmh oj
f^OPl) P<j;h->H U P C/3 O U .HUSIilCHiD'H 0) <D P-, G OS OPPP GXP d)3 G OPtn «3 3 'G-WHO<!3)H^Hrt! QEnKfH D ^3 OJ
flcHHH GIO CD^H G 3 OP rd G-H OS tP M Idfl rP»H >ST3
dJ (U (d rt) 3)0) H3Cd)HCXCO<DSHQ) HH >i LH G G-Q re) G Tl p p 0)
a a g g-h a s-H re)PM e re) 0) p a is en >i(U re) OJ p <s re) re) o-h p u o+j&hPP O O re) OJP re) G H P G+J O aCQPP G G 0>G G W re) HUUH-d(D.H3t/l
P P-H.H P P P P O re) tPOW+->P PGOCUPOOGP «>H.HOre)+JOi -H >i
X) njP+JP CUrtJ OJ-H CUO re)-H re)-H P >ire)-H-HiH OJ-H-H QJ-H Ph p P GWOHG>
&iQ4<d re) G 3 ^C+i OJ • CUP O-G re) > P-iOP 0) GPPMhH o 0) Q < re) <U PH-H re)
QQ I I (J | QOZ I I QS I I <DZQ I S I | SISQE: ai<c<«Q3 I I I I I I
i i <z*z i a, I i i «:-«: I i q<;p i I o i ^^ I i I i ^ i I I toHfc-^tnn




Figure 2. 1 CSIP Cycle
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III. BUDGET PROCEDURES AND RATE DEVELOPMENT
A. BUDGET PROCEDURES
The budget process for the CSIF is directly linked to
that of its customers since the activity of the fund is
determined by those customers. The major justification for
the budget submission exists in stated customer require-
ments, with the remainder gualified by DCA's plans for the
backbone networks. As for any organization within the DOD
budgeting procedures can be broken down into long range
planning and short term concern for the upcoming budget year
submission, as well as proper apportionment of the budget
currently under consideration by Congress. A complete
discussion of the total budgeting process of the DOD is not
the purpose of this section. Only those aspects which are
pertinent or unigue to the CSIF will be examined. One point
to be made before beginning is that budgeting for the CSIF
is a crucial aspect of the entire DOD Operations and
Maintenance (OEM) appropriation budget process. In FY83,
the CSIF OSM requests were 12% of the total DOD requests.
The CSIF accounted for 73X of the total 05M requirement in
the DCD Five Year Program. [Ref. 7: p. 14].
A long range budgeting program resides in the DCS
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) which is a
subsystem of the DOD PPBS process and the Five Year Defense
Plan (FYDP) Telecommunications Subsystem. The DCS PPBS both
contributes and reacts to the overall DOD PPBS process, as
do all DOD component procedures. Throughout the steps a DCS
plan is being formulated and updated, defining the DCS
objectives for a 10-year period and requirements for a
5-year period. Modifications are made in requirements as a
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result of fiscal constraints established and identification
of objectives that will or will not be supported in the
overall DOD planning.
Actual budget year considerations are based on submis-
sion of the DCS Five Year Program and DOD components'
Program Objective Memoranda (POKs) proposed distribution of
resources to the DCS. After review of these reports, OSD
issues a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) for the
Consolidated Telecommunications Program (CTP) . Using this
PDM as guidance, DOD components then submit DCS budget esti-
mates for incorporation in the CTP budget recommended to
SECDEF. The process continues with submission of the
President's budget, Congressional action and the apportion-
ment process within OSD.
In a narrower sense, looking at only the budget year of
concern vice long range planning processes, the customers
and DCA are even more closely tied together in the determi-
nation of budget estimates and required reports. Yearly
budget estimates for the CSIF require extensive input from
customers in order to determine both subscriber rates and
DECCO overhead rates, which are the basis for revenue esti-
mates included in the budget submission. In turn, planned
CSIF rates are integral to customer's O&M requests for tele-
communications funding.
DECCO is required to develop for Headquarters DCA,
annual budget estimates to include estimated operating costs
of the division for use in determining planning overhead
charges. In addition, annual budget calls to all CSIF
customer activities supply estimates of leased communica-
tions services to be procurred through the fund. Customer
estimates are based on planning subscriber rates which are
provided for the fiscal year in question plus four subseq-
uent years. Inputs are analyzed and used by DCA to prepare
the CSIF budget which is submitted to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)- ASD(C).
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At the same time, customers are preparing their own
budget submissions to AS D including OSM requests for
payments to the CSIF. Estimates are based on the planning
rates which have been provided by DCA based on past customer
inputs. DOD component telecommunications budget submissions
impacting the CSIF are provided to DCA by OSD for review and
the preparation of analyses and recommendations. DCA repre-
sentatives participate in the CSIF and DOD component opera-
tions budget hearings conducted jointly by OMB and ASD
representatives. One important factor that must be
addressed during the OMB hearings is that CSIF submissions
and customer OSM fundings requests must be adjusted in
concert as programs are cut or funds added.
In addition to coordination of this process, the CSIF
program and financing data must be prepared for submission
with the President's budget in January. The package
provides detailed analysis of obligation rates and balances,
financial condition, statements of revenue and expense,
analysis of Government equity, and various other supporting
schedules covering all aspects of the CSIF actual and
projected operations.
One distinction of the budgeting process for the CSIF,
as for all industrial funds, is that the primary purpose is
not competition for funds, but a means of reporting fund
position, future actions and development of rates. All
industrial funds reports are consolidated in a submission to
Congress. Table II through VII provide examples from the FY
84 submission to Congress. Tables II through IV are a
consolidated financial profile of all five DOD industrial
funds. They provide details on the total industrial fund
picture within the Defense Department. Tables V through VII
show the same information for the Defense Industrial Fund
alone. Note that the Defense Industrial Fund includes both
the CSIF and the Defense Clothing and Textile Center. The
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CSIF is not broken out by itself. The submission to
Congress includes similar breakdowns for the other four
funds plus civilian personnel figures for all funds.
[fief- 4: pp. 4-6, 19-21]
Fhile the budget is before Congress for consideration,
the apportionment process is beginning. Funds must be allo-
cated to CSIF customers OSM accounts for payment of telecom-
munications services and information must be gathered for
final development of overhead and subscriber rates. DECCO
provides DCA with an estimate of the cost of the operation
of DECCO for development of the overhead rate t o be charged
CSIF customer activities. Customers provide updated access
line forecasts incorporating changes made by Congress and
other reviewing activities to the annual budget, for use in
determining subscriber rates which must be approved by
ASD(C). Prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year,
apportionment hearings are held, OSH funds are allocated,
and submitted rates are approved. As will be seen later the
budget process, both procedures and timing, can be trouble-
some to the CSIF and its customers.
B. RATE DEVELOPMENT - AOTOVON
The rates charged customers for backbone services are
the mainstay of the CSIF. As was seen in Chapter II,
Section D f total backbone services accounted for approxi-
mately 52% of fund activity in FY 83 with approximately 51%
attributed to AUTCVON and AUTODIN services alone.
Considering the significance of these activities, the devel-
opment of the rates are of equal importance since it is
through thesa rates that costs are recouped. Accurate
reflection of costs in the rates are necessary in order to
sustain the fund at its zero profit or loss status. As will






important role in structuring the system and influencing
customer behavior.
Rates are developed for AUTOVON using access fees rased
upon capability, which is determined from three characteris-
tics. The first two are directionality and precedence.
There are three ways in which access lines can be config-
ured: two-way, one-way in, and one-way out. Four prece-
dences are available: routine, priority, immediate and
flash. An arbitrary weighted unit is assigned to each line
based on its composite capability as indicated beiow




Note that two-way lines are weighted at half that of one-way
out, one-way in lines are not weighted at all and units
increase with increased precedence. These assignments are
due to several underlying assumptions. One-way out lines
are considered to generate twice as many calls as twc-way
since they are never occupied by incoming calls. One-way in
lines are not priced since they are looked upon as reducing
congestion by taking calls off the network as opposed to
contributing to network congestion by adding calls. Units
increase by precedence as a result of additional require-
ments needed and the ability to capture a larger share of
the network capacity. Chapter IV will look at these assump-
tions again while analyzing their validity and effect.
[Ref. 12]
The third factor considered under capability is area.
Four areas are designated for cost allocation: CONUS,
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Pacific, Europe and Caribbean. In addition, the intercon-
nection between the areas must be taken into account
resulting in seven cost pools to which geographical costs
are allocated: CONUS, CONUS-Europe , Europe, CONUS-Pacif ic,
Pacific, CONUS-Caribhean and Caribbean. Maximum calling
areas (MCA's) for each line are also figured into cost allo-
cation. The following MCA ' s are available [ Bef . 9: pp.
U-2,U-3] :
LOCAL: Limited to traffic between subscribers within the
following geographical areas of the Pacific and Europe:
(1) United Kingdom
(2) Germany and Belgium




(6) Taiwan, Okinawa, Philippines, and Southeast Asia
(7) Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan, Philippines, and Southeast
Asia
(8) Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan, and Korea
(9) Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan, and Philippines
AREA: Limited to traffic between subscribers served
through a complex of switching centers within the complete
geographic areas of either Europe, Pacific, or CONUS.
A3EA PLUS CONUS OR OVERSEAS: This service is available to
subscribers in CONUS that have access to both the CONUS
area and an overseas area. In addition, this service is
available to overseas subscribers having access to both
the area serving that geographical location and the CONUS.
It is not available to subscribers in CONUS not having
access to an overseas area and CONUS. The three overseas
areas having Area Plus subscriber service are Europe,
Pacific, and Caribbean.
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GLOBAL; Provides access to any subscriber in the world-
wide AUTOVON network, unlimited by geographical location.
CADIN : Continental Air Defense Integration North rates
apply to access lines originating in Canada that are homed
on continental U.S. AUTOVON switching centers.
In order to determine a cost per weighted unit per area,
costs and weighted units are aggregated by area. A division
of one by the other provides the subscriber rata. This rate
may be adjusted up or down in order to make up for prior
years' losses or gains. Table VIII provides an example of
this process. The top half of the table is a breakdown of
backbone costs by area. Cost factors are indicated on the
left. The bottom half of the table is a compilation of
weighted units segregated by area and MCA. These values are
obtained from access line estimates submitted by customers
during the budget process. Each figure is calculated by
taking each access line and multiplying it by its appro-
priate weighted unit based on directionality and precedence.
The lines for each customer are then separated by area,
placed in the correct slot and summed. For example, there
is a total of 14,676 weighted units in CONUS having a
calling area capability of CONUS-Pacific. This number was
computed by taking all customers in 30NUS with an MCA of
CONUS-Pacific, multiplying each line by the correct weighted
unit and summing. Once the summary of costs and weighted
units has been completed, the subscriber rate for each area
can be determined by dividing the cost per area by total
weighted units per area. [Ref. 12: p. 8]
The charge for any given access line is determined by
summing the applicable area and inter-area costs per
weighted unit and multiplying the total by the number of
weighted units assigned to that line. For example, using
table VIII again, a two-way access line having immediate
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precedence and area plus capability for CON US and the
Pacific must share in the costs for CONUS, $253, CONUS to
Pacific, $206, and Pacific, $340 for a total of $799 per
weighted unit. A two way line with immediate precedence is
assigned a weighted unit of 3, giving a total charge for the
line of $2397. In the case of a global area line its total
cost per weighted unit would be determined by summing the
costs per weighted unit of all seven areas.
Projected rates must be set for customers several years
in advance. In order to estimate costs and total weighted
units per area, forecasts of access lines to be used must be
obtained from customers. In May of each year, DCA requests
this information on access lines for current, program and
budget year. Subscribers must provide data estimates on end
of year line numbers and type and average line use
throughout the year. This information combined with others
can then be used to determine subscriber rates and subseq-
uently total revenue that can be expected from each
customer.
A clarification concerning all subscriber rates should
be made before continuing. Though these rates are developed
using access line characteristics, it must be remembered
that they are not a charge for these lines. Line charges
are paid directly by each user. The rates, though based on
access lines, are a means of distributing the costs of the
jointly used backbone networks.
C. RATE DEVELOPMENT - AOTODIN
AUTODIN rate development is similar to that of AUTOVON
in that total costs of the system must be determined based
on aggregate access line connections and total weighted
units for the system must be calculated using a system of
applying weights to some measurable system attribute. For
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AUTODIN, the line characteristic used is line speed since it
is this factor that determines the amount of Accumulation
and Distribution Unit [ADO) data memory required. The ADU
interfaces between the central processing unit of the
AUTODIN switch and incoming and outgoing channels and is the
first constraint on switch capacity. The interface is
necessary to establish compatibility between sending and
receiving subscriber equipment due to different transmission
rates. Because the magnetic core storage elements of the
ADO are scanned at a fixed rate and the CPU operates at
internal speeds faster than sending or receiving subscriber
equipment, differing amounts of AD3 data memory are required
for differing speed access lines. [ Ref . 13: pp. 7-8]
Weighted units are assigned to the access lines in propor-
tion to the amount of ADU space required by them. Current
weighted unit assignments are as follows [ Eef - 3: p. 16] :





300 and lower 2
In order to calculate AUTODIN subscriber rates, two
pieces of information are required: total cost and total
weighted units. Total weighted units are obtained by solic-
iting forecasted access line utilization from customers.
Input is given for current, program and budget year in the
form of end year estimates and average line year estimates.
The average year line estimates are multiplied by the
applicable weighted unit for baud rate and then by 12 in
order to transition from monthly data to yearly. The neces-
sity for this last step is dependent upon whether forecasts
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provided are monthly or yearly estimates. Total weighted
units for a given customer are then summed over all baud
rates. This process must be repeated for all subscribers to
tally total system weighted units. Total backbone costs are
computed based on backbone expenses including costs of the
switching centers, trunks, AUTODIN interconnects, an infla-
tion factor, plus the DECCO overhead charges. Dividing
costs by total weighted units gives the subscriber rate or
cost per weighted unit. As with AOTOVON this may be
adjusted based on previous years profits or losses. Tables
IX through XI illustrate the process just described. Table
IX is an example of one customer's access line forecast.
This particular example is on a monthly basis. Table X
shows the calculation of one customer's total weighted
units. Note that it is the average line estimates from the
budget year that are used. This same procedure would be
repeated for all customers and the values summed to provide
the total number of ADTODIN weignted units for the year in
guestion. Table XI provides a breakdown of AUTDDIN backbone
costs. The subscriber rate is determined by dividing total
costs by total weighted units. Once the rate is available,
the cost for a given line can be calculated by multiplying
this rate by the appropriate weighted unit of the line based
on baud rate. [ Ref - 3: pp. 15-17].
This chapter has detailed the current practices in rate
development and budget procedures. These steps have been
the basic procedures since the inception of the fund, but
questions exist as to whether the status quo serves all
involved, including the system itself, to the best advan-
tage. The next chapter investigates this premise.
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TABLE II
Industrial Funds Submissions To Congress - A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL FUND SUMMARY
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)
1982 1983 1984
Actual Es t ima te Estimate
Program by activities:
Costs of goods and services
produced :
Army 2,831,727 3,092,200 3,171,600
Navy 11,886,388 12,616,700 13,296,000
Marine Corps 69,482 78,700 82,600
Air Force S, 600, 173 6,120,900 6,453,700
Defense 746,972 818,400 859,800
Total costs of goods and
services produced 21,134,942 22,726,900 23,863,700
Adjustment of prior year
expense
-33,648
Total program costs 21,101,294 22,726,900 23,863,700


























end of year 2,426,183 2,610,782 2,266,482
Budget authority
Relation of obligations to outlays:
Obligations incurred, net.... 807,730 -184,600 344,300
Receivables in excess of
obligations, start of year.
-2,196,215 -1,718,464
-1,807,664
Receivables in excess of







Industrial Funds Submissions To Congress - B
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL FUND SUMMARY







Fund balance with Treasury.. 707,719 803,119 1,258,019
Accounts receivable (net)... 934,260 941,334 * 971
' S97
Advances made 220,919 231,684 254 * 466
Inventories.... 1,707,864 1,647,782 1,668,640
Other assets 707,661 708,424 694,610
Capital Property (Net) 4,166,361 4,668,785 5,051,413
Total assets 8,444,784 9,001,128 9,898,745
Liabi li t ies :
Selected liabilities:
Accounts pa/able and accrued
liabilities 2,879,804 2,959,451 2,984,261
Advance received 129,594 112,216 113 164
Unfunded liabilities 228,250 219,044 2 7 3*899
Other liabilities 230,117 110,106 88^561




Unobligated balance 2,426,183 2,610,782 2,266 482
Undelivered orders 4,668,964 4,999,655 S, 124^006
Unfinanced budget authority:
Unfilled customer orders..
-7,449,043 -7,835,376 -7 239 659
Invested capital 5,330,915 5,825,250 6,33s!o31
Total Government equity... 4,977,019 5,600,311 6,488,860
Total Liabilities and Equity.... 8,444,784 9,001,128 9,898,74S
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TABLE I?
Industrial Funds Submissions To Congress - C
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL FUND SUMMARY
Revenue and Expense and Changes in Government Equity
(in thousands of dollars)
1982 1983 1984




Sale of goods and services. 20,365,548 25,955,000 24,136,800
Expense
Materials, supplies, and
parts used 5,081,255 5,234,697 5,363,759Salaries and wages 7.936.08S 8,207,638 8,321,029Contractual services 7,619,360 8,189,207 8 925 483Other expenses 498,242 1,095,358 i,2S3*429
Cost of goods and services
produced 21,134,942 22,726,900 23,863,700
Work in process increase (-)
or decrease
-554,210 3,153,800 -86,900
Cost of goods and services
sold 20,580,732 25,880,700 23,776,800
Net income or loss (-) for
the yeaT
-215,184 74,300 360,000
Analysis of changes in Government
equi ty
:
Paid- in capital :
Opening balance 4,573,196 4,950,211 5,928 855Transactions : '
Assets/liabilities
capi tallied
(-) decapitalized 71,117 548,992 528 549
r,
transfers 305,898 429,652 40,282Closing balance 4,950,211 5 ,928 ,355 6,497,686
Retained income or deficit (-):
Opening balance 516,613 26,808 -328 544Transactions: '





-215,184 74,300 360,000Adjustment of prior year
revenue and expense 31 277
Other transfers
-305 * 898 -429*652 -40* 282Closing balance 26,808 -328,544 -8,326
Total Government equity (end





Industrial Funds Submissions To Congress - D
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL FUND


















Total costs of goods and





































Relation of obligations to outlay
Obligations incurred, net....
Receivables in excess of
obligations, start of year.
Receivables in excess of


















Industrial Funds Submissions To Congress - E
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL FUND
Financial Condition (in thousands of dollars)
1982 1983 1984






Fund balance with Treasury.. 72,749 66,349 60 349
Accounts receivable (net)... 72,687 47 355 37*555
Inventories 4,687 3^391 3 ! 391Other assets 864 519 519
Capital Property (Net) 9,985 10,385 11,285
Total assets 160,972 128,499 113, S99
Liabilities :
Selected liabilities:
Accounts payable and accrued
liabilities 104,153 87,989 76,789
296 296




Unobligated balance 48,838 32,038 27 438Undelivered orders 29,945 29,745 29*745
Unfinanced budget authority: '
Unfilled customer orders..
-36,560 -36,346 -36 346
Invested capital 14,591 14,777 15^677
Total Government equity... 56,314 40,214 36.S14
Total Liabilities and Equity.... 160,972 128,499 113,599
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T&BLE VII
Industrial Funds Submissions To Congress - F
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL FUND
Revenue and Expense and Changes in Government Equity






Sale of goods and services. 729, 08S 801,400 855,200
Expense
Materials, supplies, and
parts used 2,974 3,262 3,466Salaries and wages 27,370 28,989 30 516Contractual services 716,397 785,022 824 611Other expenses 231 1,127 1*207
Cost of goods and services
P roduced 746,972 818,400 859,800
-440 ....
Work, in process increase (-)
or decrease
Cost of goods and services
sold....... 746,532 818,400 8S9.800










Opening balance 33,449 33,477 33 377Transactions:
Assets/liabilities
capital i zed
(-) decapitalized 28 400 900Other transfers u
Closing balance
\ 33',477 33^ 877 34^777
Retained income or deficit (-):
Opening balance ' 40,046 23,337 6 337Transactions: •"'







-4,600Adjustment of prior year
revenue and expense 738
Closing balance
; ... 23,337 6 ! 337 i',737
Total Government equity (end
of y ea r).. 56,814 40,214 36,514
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UNIT ASSIGN. X 12 MONTHS
TOTAL
WT. UNITS
45 X 12 x 12 6,480
2400 BAUD 62 X 8 x 12 5,952
1200 BAUD 91 X 6 x 12 6,552
600 BAUD 33 X 4 x 12 1,584
300 & LOWER
TOTAL











NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL SWITCHES (E/Y)
CONUS 8 XXX
OVERSEAS (INCLUDING HAWAII) 7 XXX
EXPENSES
SWITCHINC CENTERS




O&M OF SWITCHINC CENTERS 16,890
DEPOT MAINTENANCE (OVERSEAS) 400
OTHER AND NON - RECU R l< I NC 490
TOTAL SWITCHING CENTERS 43,320
TRUNKS^
CONUS (LEASED) ]9 520
EUROPE (CHANNEL PACK) 16 850
PACIFIC (LEASED) i, 480
PACIFIC (CHANNEL PACK) 7 4 10




1_, 6 7 2
TOTAL AUTOVON INTERCONNECTS 1,801
INFLATION FACTOR ADD-ON (5.12) 2,416
OVERHEAD 602





IV. ANALYSIS OF COBEENT CSIF PRACTICES
A. BENEFITS OF THE FOND
Chapters I through III have dealt with background
material on the CSIF. Its objectives and mechanics have
been discussed. Very few functions exist without faults,
however, and even the best can benefit from scrutiny. Over
time, the emergence of new policies, studies or technologies
may require a rethinking of objectives and alteration of
existing procedures. The CSIF is no exception to this.
This is not meant to imply that the fund has not performed
within expections but that there are areas that have been
identified for improvements. Before looking at these
issues, an iteration of the benefits of the fund should be
considered to put things in perspective.
The principal reason for the establishment of industrial
funds was to promote a business like buyer-seller relation-
ship within the DOD for appropriate activities. Measurement
of success in this area is difficult in that business prac-
tices do not extend to making a profit, the normal means of
comparing accomplishments in the business community.
Questions as to whether the CSIF does indeed aid in reducing
costs or inducing the "buyer" activity to greater efficiency
have no quantifiable answers. Comparisons with the past are
not possible since the CSIF and combined communications
assets evolved together. Though precise evaluation is not
possible, it seems intrinsic to the concept of industrial
funding that benefits would accrue.
The primary activity of the fund is concentrated in
jointly used backbone systems such as AUTCVON, AUTODIN,
ARPANET, WIN and commercial satellites. Logic iictates that
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for the sake of simplicity and efficiency a common point of
contact for leasing requirements and subsequent payments is
required. A consolidated communications effort requires
such centralization unless the responsibility of each system
is parceled out to individual services or other agencies
involved. The duplication of effort inherent in this alter-
native method is easily envisioned. Each organization would
require its own experts in acquisition policies, tariff
analysis and communications regulations, as well as many
others. The situation would also require a multitude of
industrial funds to accomplish the same purpose being served
now.
There are many other reasons which exemplify the
benefits offered by the CSIF. The ability to take advantage
of reduced rates due to bulk leasing is present in the
current system. An obvious example of this is the Telpak
rates offered by AT&T during the 1960's and 70' s. It also
provides a means of centralized accounting and record
keeping allowing for totaling long-haul communications costs
within the DOD and then distributing these costs back to the
users on a predetermined basis. Advantages of rate stabili-
zation have already been discussed. Such a program would
not be possible without the CSIF, leaving the services vuln-
erable to fluctuations in prices. The advantages realized
Ly rate stabilization can be seen in Figure 4.1. . [Bef. 3:
p. 31]. Prior to 1975, the year the rate stabilization
program began, the CSIF was able to remain quite close to
its target of no profit or loss. As has already been
discussed, however, this was at a cost to customers of rate
changes throughout the year requiring repro gramming of
funds. The insulation provided by rate stabilization is
evident in the post 1975 period. Though the fund itself
must work from year to year to offset previous years'
discrepancies, the customers are no longer subject to
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constant changes. The point to be made is that the CSIF
allowed for correction of an identified problem. Without
it, there would have been no simple way of protecting CSM
funding from the disruptions that existed.
The CSIF also offers an avenue for coordination between
DCA and all user agencies of DCS. The budget process and
rate development procedures described in Chapter III
requires close cooperation between all involved. Intentions
must be known in order to match OSM funding requests with
expected activity and rates. The ability for DCA to influ-
ence DCS architecture and users through pricing policies is
also contained in the CSIF.
The provisions for cost collection and allocation,
system coordination and using pricing policies to the
benefit of the DCS are in place. However, it can be argued
how effectively they have been used and whether existing
procedures are sufficient for accomplishing the intent.
This idea will be examined further in the remainder of this
chapter.
B. BA1AGEHENT ISSUES
There is no doubt that the CSIF is a valid method of
financing the DCS and that its operations are advantageous
in many respects. As was pointed out at the beginning of
this chapter, however, every system is open to revision if
areas are found that are not performing as first planned.
Many studies have been conducted over the years in an effort
to highlight the shortcomings of the CSIF. The remainder of
this chapter will deal with two areas of concern: factors
effecting the management of the DCS and causes of ineffi-
cient operation of the systems. Though this is somewhat of
an artificial separation, since there is an interplay
between the two, the first is more interested in the ability
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to obtain needed information and execute adequate control,
whereas, the second is concerned with the allocation of
costs and the effects on the systems resulting from the
incentives created by the allocation. Rather than include
solutions to discrepancies discussed here, they will be
saved for the following chapter. The issues addressed in
this section have been primarily extracted from reference 7.
The present method of financing restricts lease versus
buy flexibility virtually locking in the decision once it
has been made. Changes in needs, prices or revision of a
program now require time consuming appropriation transfers
or O&M reprogramming actions. If an initial determination
is made by one of the services to buy a specific item, that
cost is funded through a procurement appropriation. If, at
a later date, it is decided that leasing the item through
DECCO is more advantageous, the funds authorized for
procurement are no longer of use since communications leases
are paid for through C&'A appropriations. The service's only
options are to proceed with the purchase, despite the deci-
sion in favor of leasing, or to delay the project until 0&I1
funding is made available. The same situation exists if a
decision is initially made to lease with a later determina-
tion that the item should be purchased. This problem is not
confined to individual agency's requirements but extends
thoughout the whole of the DCS. Most equipment purchased
for DCS, such as satellites, is done so through various
users' procurement authorizations. The situation is
compounded in these cases in that procurement funds are
locked into one agency's appropriations, when what is needed
is OSM money for all that are going to be using the service.
Another problem area involves cost allocation practices.
Though issues of efficiency are also encountered here, they
will be looked at in a later section leaving management
questions for now. There are four causes of concern in
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dealing with cost allocation practices which should be
considered. The following list outlines these areas.
(a) Capital equipment and OS M requirements of the DCS are
financed principally by the military departments, as
just described. The services of the DCS, however, are
used by a variety of agencies, both DOD and non-DOD.
(b) Military personnel costs are excluded from DCS cost
allocations. This is an issue due to the fact that
operations of the various switching centers associated
with the DCS are spread among the various services.
The present system requires the Military Departments
involved to incorporate the costs of military
personnel at these facilities into their own cost
structures.
(c) Subscribers who primarily make use of government owned
facilities, as opposed to leased services, virtually
pay no costs.
(d) Amortization of capital equipment costs are not
allowed except for small amounts. Budget distortions
result since costs cannot be budgeted for evenly
throughout the useful life of the equipment, compli-
cating accurate cost analyses and program
justification.
The primary result of allocating costs in this manner is
that the true cost of the DCS is hidden. As a result, cost
analyses of individual organizations requirements are
distorted in lease versus buy decisions which compounds the
problem of inflexibility just discussed. The budget process
is also effected in that a disproportionate amount of the
financing must be obtained by only a few of the actual
users. This is not a problem in itself except when
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difficulties arise in getting disproportionately high budget
requests through Congress- Also, DCA bears the responsi-
bility for the totality of the system, yet is required to
deal with fragmented cost data across departmental lines.
There is currently no central data base fascilitating cost
comparisons between the DCS, other federal agencies, and
industry costs for telecommunications. Inadequate cost
visibility also prohibits identification of DCS costs to the
appropriate force misssions, associated with the budget,
which use DCS telecommunications capability.
Furthermore, DCA must accomplish its planning and
programming within the constraints of no identifiable fiscal
target. Available financing depends on customer 05M alloca-
tions. Unnecessary work can occur only to find that inade-
quate financing will exist from DCS user components. DCS
requirements are dependent on each military departments'
program and budget review process. As such, the needs of
the DCS must compete with priorities and requirements within
each department. The budget evolution for any of the DOD
departments is a long and often confusing process.
Eudgeting for the DCS through the CSIF is even more so
considering the number of players that must take part. One
advantage always discussed in connection with industrial
funds is that the activity is insulated from the appropria-
tion battle for money. As has just been pointed out, this
is in reality a mixed blessing in that they are also denied
the opportunity to justify financing deemed necessary for
the DCS, since this is incorporated into the requests of a
variety of departments and agencies. A situation has been
created whereby there is no single voice of justification
for a system that was devised to provide centralization.
Recalling the budget procedures from Chapter III, an
integral part of the process was the determination of rates
based on projected costs and projected number of access
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lines. These estimates were used by DCA in the development
of required reports submitted to Congress and in the calcu-
lation of subscriber rates. The rates are used by customers
for two purposes. At one point in time they are used by
subscriber for their own planning purposes in developing C&M
requests for the support of DCS requirements. Later they
are used to determine actual payments to the CSIF. There
are several difficulties relating to this procedure that
have developed over the years.
One problem is that rates are developed prior to use
based on projected average number of lines. The current
system has built into it an incentive to overestimate access
line forcasts. By doing this, the denominator for the
subscriber rate is increased making the rate for all
subscribers smaller. Throughout the year, for those
subscribers who have overestimated access line connections,
smaller payments to the C5IF are required and the extra O&X
funds are now available for other purposes. In addition,
the CSIF falls short in recouping its costs for that year
due to the establishment of rates less than required. It
should be obvious that the CSIF's deficit is equal to the
"profit" made by those customers overestimating their
demand. [ Hef . 13: pp. 63-67]
The trend for AOTODIN can be seen in Table XII.
[Ref. 13: p. 66]- Prior to 1975 budgeted forecasts were
quite close to actual usage. From 1975 on, this has not
been the case. It seems that a potential explanation for
this lies in the fact that 1975 was the year the rate stabi-
lization program was instituted. Prior to this, rates could
be adjusted to meet changing circumstances, including
demand. This is no longer possible with rates changing only
once a year at the same time new OS M funds are appropriated.
The foregoing is not meant to imply that all customers
are intentionally overestimating requirements. There are
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definitely legitimate reasons for discrepancies between
budgeted and actual needs. However/ it is also true that
there is no interest in underestimating demand since the
effect on rates and O&li funds is the reverse of that
described above. By underestimating access lines, rates are
higher than required. For the subscriber who has underesti-
mated, additional SM funds will be needed or else require-
ments will have to be cut.
There are other problems associated with the budgeting
process and rate stabilization program. Because of the
dates established for various submissions in the overall
federal government budget cycle, information used to
initially develop rates for a given fiscal year is approxi-
mately fifteen months old by the time the actual rates are
set. Subscribers must estimate average monthly access lines
fifteen months or more prior to actual usage. In addition
they are using planning rates developed from even more anti-
quated data to determine their budgeting priorities.. Actual
rates for the fiscal year are not established until well
into the period of Congressional action on the budget for
the upcoming fiscal year. Rates undergo revisions based on
changes to budget requests by Congress. The end result is
that the final rates actually used during the fiscal year
are not known to customers, or the CSIF for that matter,
until fairly close to the time they are implemented.
Stabilized rates also add a measure of inflexibility to
the system. As has been stated, their purpose was to
protect the customer from price fluctuations. However,
insulation from price increases also prohibits gaining any
advantage from possible price decreases. An example of
this, though not connected with the CSIF, is the Military
SeaLift Command (MSC) which is a component of the Navy
Industrial Fund. During the oil crisis, the rates for the
MSC were naturally inflated over previous years.
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Afterwards, however, during a period of unstable and
decreasing prices, the rates were not able to adjust to
rapidly changing circumstances. This resulted in the MSC
portion of the NIF showing an expanding profit for several
years at the expense of its customers. The argument could
be put forward that a similar situation might transpire with
the CSIF in todays environment of changing regulations and
the divestiture of ATST.
C. AI1CCATIVE EFFICIENCY AND PRICING POLICIES
Besides questions concerning effective management of the
DCS are those involving whether the current practices result
in an efficient distribution of cost among users. Two of
the areas that have been studied in this respect are mili-
tary personnel costs at AUTCVON and AUTODIN switching facil-
ities and DOD and non-DOD agencies which do not pay for
services due to differences in the financing of leased and
government- owned portions of the DZS. Both of these issues
were mentioned in Section B while discussing management
issues.
The responsibility for the various switching facilities
associated with the DCS are delegated to the services. For
example, the Navy operates three AUTODIN switching centers,
five AUTOSEVOCOM switching centers and two AUTOVON switching
centers. Though civilian costs are currently reimbursed to
the services, no such credit is provided for costs incurred
by the services for nilitary personnel used at the centers.
Table XIII shows a breakdown of funding changes that would
result if a credit for military personnel costs were
included in the CSIF- [Bef. 14: p-4]. Though it could be
argued that similar situations exist throughout the DOD with
joint programs, the issue is distribution of costs as an aid
in increasing the efficiency of the system. By attributing
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military personnel costs to the services vice the DCS, it is.
adding to the "hidden* costs of the DCS and penalizing some
departments more than others. Tne questions remains as to
the impact of this on efficiency. Farther analysis will be
provided in Chapter V.
Another area that has been questioned is the discrepancy
between who pays for the O&M and procurement costs of the
government-owned portions of the DCS and who uses these
systems. 88% of the DCS is leased and therefore financed
through the CSIF. The remaining 12% is government-owned and
financed through the Military Departments and DCA appropri-
ated funds. [fief, 14: p„ 5 ]- The government-owned assets
are broken down into three categories: Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS) , Transmission Media, and Common
Dser Switching Systems. Tables XIV through XVI indicate the
comparison between those who pay and those who use these
services. The figures in the Tables are in millions of
dollars. [Bef. 14: pp. 2-3]- It is obvious from these that
the costs are not currently distributed with any regards to
use, thus undermining one of the purposes of the CSIF of
having customers pay for what they get, providing an incen-
tive to hold down requirements to those actually needed.
The good management practices and efficiency desired are
degraded.
It has been alluded to throughout that a major problem
confronting the DCA and its responsibilities to the DCS is
that it lacks total control over the system. Areas of
responsibility are delegated to others for both procurement
and management when dealing with government-owned segments.
A more serious problem exists when evaluating where DCA's
authority begins and ends when dealing with the leased
assets of the DCS. DCA's control extends only to the back-
bone portions of the DCS. Number and type of terminal
equipment and access lines are the prerogative of the users.
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This has the potential of having a tremendous impact on the
effectiveness of the system in meeting its expressed goals.
Though a structure has been built to centralize leasing
and payment, the centralization does not extend to manage-
ment of the systems involved. There is no single focal
point for evaluating, authorizing or requiring the optimum
mix of access lines with particular baud rates for AUTODIN
or the correct ratio of precedence or directionality for
AUTOVON. This is left to the discretion of the individual
departments based on their perception of their own needs and
ability or desire to pay. It is natural that concern over
one's own needs takes precedence over or overshadows those
of the total structure. The result, however, is that there
is no means of effectively controlling congestion, system
architecture, system performance and numerous other vari-
ables.
One avenue that is available to DCA for control is its
pricing policies. Though DCA has no inherent authority in
access line decisions, its pricing policies for the backbone
system are directly linked to these lines as outlined in
Chapter III. The remainder of this chapter will be spent
analysing how effective current pricing policies are in
influencing user behavior and how efficient these policies
are in allocating costs. Though rate development was
described for both AUTO VON and AUTODIN, this discussion will
be limited to AUTOVON. However, a similar case can be made
for AUTODIN and the other systems.
The intent of the CSIF pricing policy is to allocate
costs to subscribers based on their capabilities in using
the system. In relation to AJTOVON this would imply
charging based on the ability to increase congestion of the
system. Weighted units are assigned in a manner which
supposedly accomplishes this. By applying weighted units to
precedence and directionality, the assumption is that these
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are the factors influencing system costs and congestion.
These characteristics, however, are not a true reflection of
costs. For example, the monthly port fee charged by a
common carrier for a line or trunk is the same whether it is
two-way or one-way; and the cost of providing pre-emption
capability is nearly the same regardless of the level of
precedence provided. [ Ref «> 12: p. 9]. The question then is
what effect does basing charges on these characteristics
have?
An analysis of the effect of current weighted units
based on precedence allows some insight into who is actually
paying and for what they are paying. Table XVII indicates a
breakdown of charge per weighted unit and average charge per
line for various area capabilities based on projections for
FY 1978. [Ref. 12: p. 1 1 ] By comparing the first and third
columns it can be seen that the ratios between areas for
charge per line and charge per weighted unit ara not consis-
tent throughout. For example, the charge per weighted unit
of a line with global capacity is approximately five times
that per weighted unit for CONDS only lines, whereas, the
average charge per line in the same categories is fifteen
times greater.
It is precedence that accounts for these differences.
Statistics on precedence capabilities of oversea lines and
area only lines prove the point.




The columns are indicating the percentage of access having
precedences greater than routine or priority with a given
calling capability. £Hef. 12: p. 12]
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The reasons for these differences are obvious to anyone
who has ever tried to place an AOTOVON call overseas. Using
routine or priority precedence is virtually worthless due to
the volume of overseas traffic compared to trunk capacity.
As a result, assigning weighted units to precedence is in
fact assigning a charge to distance and becomes essentially
a means of determining overseas access making the precedence
charge a charge for overseas calls. By adding the values of
average cost per line and average charge per line provided
in Table XVIII, the analysis of the effect of precedence can
be extended to include whether or not those who are creating
the costs are actually paying for them. The table shows
that this is not the case with area-plus and global
customers paying a disproportionate share of the costs due
to higher precedence lines, in essence subsidizing area only
customers. [Ref. 12: p. 16]
One issue involving directionality naeds to be
discussed. It should be recalled from Chapter III that no
weighted units are assigned to in-only lines based on the
assumption that they serve in reducing system congestion
since they only have the ability to remove calls from the
system. The flaw in this assumption is easily apparent. If
incoming calls are routed to the in-only line first, this
frees lines with outgoing capability for more calls. It is
probably a valid assumption that a new line was added to
begin with because of excess demand. The addition of an
in-only line results in increased congestion, the exact
opposite of its purpose. Studies have shown that customers
are well aware of this fact and use it to their advantage.
Rather than adding additional in-only lines, they are used
to replace existing one-way out or two-way lines thereby
reducing costs without increasing capacity. [Ref- 12: p.
19]
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It is not hard to conclude from this that those causing
the congestion on the system or those with the greatest
ability of placing a call are not necessarily the ones
paying for this capability. In addition, there are problems
concerning who is best able to take advantage of the situ-
ation. Large commands are understandably better able to
adjust their mix of lines. If a small command functions
with only one access line, it must be two-way. It is also
true that the majority of in-only lines are in CONOS (4299) ,
compared to Europe (105) and the Pacific (124). This adds
to the distortion in cost allocation among the areas just
discussed.
It appears that current pricing policies are defeating
their purpose in a number of areas. Congestion is not being
controlled, those paying the most for services are not the
ones accumulating the most costs and are not the ones
receiving the best services, and incentives are directed
toward compounding the problem rather than alleviating it.
The size of the overseas network is set by contingency
requirements, so no attempt is made to relieve the
congestion resulting from peacetime use. Therefore, users
in these areas are forced to pay for higher priced prece-
dence lines, as a result of weighted units, whose charges
exceed actual costs. The size of the CONUS system is vari-
able, with changes made as necessary to obtain a set grade
of service. There are no restrictions, however, on how the
system is altered and current practices favor an individual
adding lines in a way proving detrimental to the system.
This chapter has identified a variety of criticisms
directed at current CSIF practices. These range from the
inflexibility of and lack of information available for
constructive decision making to the ineffective incentive
structure created bj pricing policies. Problems due to
budgeting procedures and the division of responsibilities
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were also identified. Criticism serves no purpose unless
made in conjunction with valid alternatives. The following
chapter will attempt to provide this by looking at several
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Defe use Satellite Communications System
Cost ($) Cost (%) Usage (%)
MilDepts 2,391 96 65
















Coam on User Swi tching Systems
Cost ($) Cost {%) Usage (%)
MilDepts 235 72 93









































































CONUS $ 323 $ 286 14,013 $ 4,523 $ 4,008
Europe 85 61 819 70 50
Pacific 983 629 397 390 250
Caribbean 14 4 NA — —
1
AREA PLUS
CONUS-Europe 1,456 1,950 237 345 462
CONUS-Pacific 2,031 2,765 353 717 976
CONUS -Caribbean 677 956 86 58 82
i GLOBAL
All 3,518 4,446 304 1,069 1,352
Totals (Monthly) 7,173 7,179
Totals (Yearly) 86,071 86,153
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7. ALTEB NAT IVES
A. aASAGEHENT AND EFFICIENCY
Several of the problems discussed in Chaptar IV have no
viable solution. By this it is meant that the issue is
larger than the CSIF. Various difficulties with the budget
procedure and rate stabilization program were targeted
throughout- Though options will be addressed for a number
of the points raised, certain questions, such as the timing
of the information required to prepare the budget, have no
easy answers. Issues surrounding this aspect, involve the
whole PPBS process within the DOD and can not be answered
for the CSIF in isolation. Some of the problems discussed
concerning the rate stabilization program must also be
considered in the right perspective, specifically the ques-
tions on the inability of the present system to adjust rates
down in favor of the customer if the situation so warrants.
In this case it is felt that the benefits outweigh the
costs, especially in today's fluctuating economy. In addi-
tion, given that the fund is obligated to adjust rates to
erase any profits frcm previous years, any lost advantages
are eventually regained.
Options have been studied for other issues raised in
Chapter IV. Section B dealt with various management
matters, primarily lease versus buy inflexibility, numerous
cost allocation problems and troucles associated with budg-
eting for the CSIF. Section C was concerned with ineffi-
ciencies attributed to current allocation practices and the
pricing policies linked with the subscriber rates presently
used to distribute backbone costs. This section will deal
with all of the issues addressed except for pricing
/ 1>
policies. The subsequent sections on usage-sensitive
pricing will analyze the primary alternative under consider-
ation in this area.
Conceptually, altering current discrepancies relating to
military personnel costs and government-owned portions of
the DCS would not be difficult. In Chapter III, it was
pointed out that civilian agencies using the DCS are charged
an additional 0.25% overhead charge to cover military
personnel costs at DECCO headquarters. A similar arrange-
ment could be initiated to offset both military personnel
costs at switching facilities and the inequities currently
existing between those who use and those who support the
government-owned DCS segments. Pith the CSIF acting as a
central collection agency, costs could be allocated and
collected from all users on a pro rata share and then reim-
bursed to the appropriate services. Expected funding
changes due to military personnel costs have already been
mentioned in Chapter IV.
Though the effects of such a reallocation of costs would
provide for a more equitable 2 distribution, it must be
determined whether such a change is warranted by increased
efficiency. It is arguable whether any significant manage-
ment benefits would be realized from redistributing military
personnel costs among ail customers. Table XIX gives a more
comprehensive breakdown of funding changes than that offered
in Chapter IV. [Ref. 14: p. 8]. From the last column it
can be seen that the major shifts occur within the three
military departments, resulting in nothing more than a
reshuffling of funds among the services. Other agencies
experience only a minor change. It is doubtful that the
Navy would embrace such a recommendation with enthusiasm
2 The concept of equity is being used here to imply that
those who are contributing to costs are paying their share
of those costs.
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since its funding responsibilities would be increased by a
larger amount than any of the others. In addition, the
amounts involved are almost trivial compared to rhe overall
size of the CSIF. It is doubtful whether such a realloca-
tion of costs would influence customers in any meaningful
way at all. There are no decisions made by users regarding
the system that are connected with military personnel at
switching facilities. There is no connection between these
costs and a subscriber's decision to increase or decrease
usage, or a determination as to tne type or number of access
lines needed. The administrative hassles associated with
incorporating this revision into the CSIF are not compen-
sated for by sufficient benefits to justify the change.
The same is not automatically true when looking at the
suggestion for pro rating costs of government-owned system
assets through the CSIF. Referring back to Tables XIV
through XVI, by consolidating the values it is seen that the
Military Departments and DCA pay 100% of the costs for all
of these resources while using only 86%. The remaining 1<4fo
is used by other Defense agencies and non-DOD organizations
wno pay nothing. The dollar amounts involved are not insig-
nificant and the potential effects on the system are 5ecri-
mental. 3y charging those customers tfno presently enjoy a
"free ride", incentives for reducing, or at least reevalu-
ating, requirements are incorporated into their planning
processes. If this would lead to reduced requirements, it
might eliminate the need to expand the existing system,
lowering future costs for all. More accurate information
for lease versus buy studies and supporting economic anal-
yses would also be available.
One conceivable problem area could be linked with this
recommendation. If those agencies currently being provided
services at no cost are confronted with the necessity of
paying for these services they night not seem as attractive
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as before. The prospect exists that they could go else-
where. The end result would he that those now paying ail
costs would continue to do so hut total costs to the govern-
ment would increase due to the expense of the alternative
system. The possibility of finding a more desirable alter-
native is limited, since it is only 1H% of the cost that are
under consideration, but it should be a consideration in
planning strategies.
These modifications do not address what are potentially
more serious issues for the DCS. Other areas critiqued in
Chapter IV, such as its inflexibility and the breakdown in
control over capital eguipment due to a segregation of
fiscal responsibility in obtaining funds and justification
of those funds, are central to DCA's ability to structure
the DCS as needed. Though several alternatives have been
put forward, the one that has gained the most acceptance
would involve using CSIF appropriations to finance ail
future DCS procurements. Procurement costs would be amor-
tized over the useful life of the equipment and both capital
and GSM costs would be recouped from DCS customers through
predetermined subscriber rates similar to the present
AUTOVON and AUTO DIN rate procedures. Koney collected could
then be used to finance additional purchases. [Bef. 7:
p.25]
This recommendation is actually an alternative to that
just discussed where capital eguipment would still be
purchased through military procurement funds but a charge
would be levied on other users. Purchasing equipment
through the CSIF extends this concept with additional
benefits. The central element of the prior suggestion still
remains. All users would have a charge leviei against thew
as opposed to the present situation. Therefore the same
benefits in terms of altering the incentive structure and
lease versus buy decisions are realized.
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Using the CSIF to. finance capital equipment offers the
following advantages as well. [Eef. 7: pp. 26-28]
(1) System priorities and program balance would more
easily be established and maintained as compared to
the present system whereby each DOD component
financing DCS requirements prepares and defends his
portion of DCS resources in the program and budget
process with varying degrees of success. CSIF
financing of the DCS would place DCA in the position
of justifying the overall system resource requirement
and DOD components justifying the cost of DCS service
they use through predetermined rates.
(2) Interservice Support Agreements (ISA) presently used
for the A0T0VON and AUTODIH program provide an effec-
tive means for managing DCS resources. ISAs serve as
a contractual arrangement between DCA, as manager of
the DCS, and military department components who
operate and maintain the system. This provides a
sound basis for viewing requirements on a system basis
throughout the FPBS process, and monitoring the use of
resources through budget execution. This procedure
also provides resources visibility necessary, where
appropriate, to establish uniform cost and manpower
factors. Extending ISAs to cover all DCS operating
costs would provide the same benefits. The CSIF
method of financing also provides an effective means
of evaluating overhead costs for the work being accom-
plished through improved visibility.
(3) Flexibility to exercise lease versus buy options would
be significantly enhanced by financing DCS capital
equipment and CSM requirements through the CSIF. CSIF
financing would allow the most cost-effective lease or
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buy options to be exercies in a timely manner at any
time.
(4) Central accounting for DCS capital and operating
expenses using uniform data elements and procedures
would significantly improve DCA' s ability to monitor
the actual application of these resources in relation-
ship to planned objectives on a system basis. The
data base would also serve as a valuable management
tool in developing cost factors and models, trend
analyses, and similar management study analyses.
(5) CSIF financing of DCS capital equipment and operating
resources should achieve DCS cost savings. Bulk
procurement, uniform cost and manpower standards, and
improved resources visiblity on a system basis are ail
management improvements which should provide more
efficient DCS financing-
There are several disadvantages associated with this
method, all of which have been alluded to in connection with
other alternatives discussed. Financing DCS capital equip-
ment and additional O&M requirements througu CSIF under
present rate structure methods, would result in a signifi-
cant increase in customer rates for DCS services and,
without adequate controls, might cause customers to obtain
services from other sources, increasing overall costs to the
government. In addition, CSIF financing DCS capital equip-
ment would transfer these costs from the military department
procurement appropriations to CSIF customer O&M accounts.
Considerable pressure in the past has Joeen applied to reduce
the Defense budget OSM costs. The initial increase to the
O&M budget, even though offset in the procurement appropria-
tion, might farther complicate justification of telecommuni-
cations O&M requirements. These concerns do not seem to
outweigh the improvements attributed to centralizing all
financing under the CSIF. The benefits derived in the area
of management efficiency and cost accountability indicate
that this is a recommendation worthy of consideration.
[Ref. 7; p. 29]
There is one final point to be looked at before atten-
tion is directed at pricing policies. In Section B of
Chapter IV the problems connected with overestimation of
demand were discussed. A proposal for correction has been
put forward involving several steps. First, agencies would
be billed at the end of the year for actual lines and for
actual costs rather than through preestablished rates as now
done. Secondly, C&M funds would be restricted for use to
DCS payments rather than being available for alternative
activities. Any 05 M surplus would be applied against the
coming year's budget. Any shortfall would be made up by
newly budgeted funds. This procedure would not eliminate
the need for estimations. Projections would still be
required for planning and budgeting purposes. The differ-
ence is that these estimates would no longer be the basis
for billing through subscriber rates. The incentive to
overestimate is removed along with its effect on the total
pricing structure. [Ref. 13: pp. 65-66]
On the surface this appears to be a viable alternative.
However, further analysis reveals the complexities involved.
Restricting OSM funds to a specific purpose presents a major
problem in the form of oversight. Who is going to be
responsible for ensuring that the money is indeed used
strictly for its designated purpose? What kind of addi-
tional accounting will be necessary to determine the amount
available for carry over to the next year's account? Must
AUTOYON funds be separate from AUTODIN funds? If a customer
ends the year with a deficit in O&M funding what additional
problems will there be in justifying the money to make up
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the shortfall plus getting an adequate level of funding for
the upcoming year? If a subscriber does have a surplus one
year, and therfore requires a lower level of funding the
following year, how hard will it be to justify funding back
to the original level in subsequent years? Might this
method not increase the amount of reprogramming required to
make up shortfalls throughout the year? The recommendation
appears to override the whole purpose of the rate stabiliza-
tion program. Though planning is done through the use of
estimates, actual payments are based on real costs. The
customer is returned to the position of being subject to
fluctuations- It is probably close to impossible to accu-
rately determine demand approximately fifteen months prior
to use. It would seem likely therefore that there will
always be a surplus or deficit for every customer. The
problem does not seem to be solved by this, it has simply
been moved back one level from the CSIF to the customer.
B. USAGE SENSITIVE PRICING - A DEFINITION
Section C of Chapter IV dealt with the inefficiencies
built into the current pricing policies of the CSIF. DCA is
concerned with three area of the DCS: capacity, congestion
and an optimum mix of lines. Considering the balance of
management authority when working with the DCS, the pricing
policies instituted through the CSIF are potentially an
effective means of accomplishing desired results. The
present method of allocating costs does not succeed because
the incentives created are counter to those needed to influ-
ence behavior in the manner wanted by DCA. As described in
Chapter IV, precedence charges, which are significant due to
the weighted units assigned to this capability, are more of
a charge for distance than the ability to "capture" system
capacity over others. It has become a charge for overseas
service, since it is a necessity in order to complete such
calls. Weighted units specified for directionality
encourage a mix of lines leading to increased congestion
with no comparable increase in capacity. In addition, there
is nothing built into the present system to induce users to
consider the number of calls made. An alternative pricing
system receiving extensive attention in both the civilian
and military sectors is usage- sensitive pricing (USP) . The
key basis of cost allocation is exactly what the name
implies - use. Rather than distributing costs by assigning
artificially defined weighted units to access lines,
customers are charged for actual use.
Economists have looked at many situations similar to the
DCS. Circumstances exist where there is a facility of fixed
capacity, as with AUTOVON or AUTODIN. The capacity must be
allocated among potential users. In addition, rules must be
developed to determine when and under what circumstances
that capacity should be enlarged. The solution to the
problem involves devising a set of charges that will lead to
the facility being utilized so as to maximize its produc-
tivity, and thus minimize the costs of providing services.
[Ref. 12: p. 26]
The existence of AUTOVON is justified by the fact that
communication needs in the event of a national emergency
require a dedicated telephone network. In the absence of an
emergency these facilities have unused and economically
useful capacity. The question is then: How can this
capacity be best allocated among alternative users? In
addition, given that the emergency capacity is inadequate
for peacetime demands, how should it be expanded upon or
integrated with other facilities in order to maximize the
economic value of the whole? [Ref. 12: p. 26]
The general set of economic principles which guide effi-
cient allocation is marginal cost pricing. A strict
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application of marginal cost pricing would require that the
price of each service provided by the system be equal to the
actual cost of the resources used in producing the last unit
of that service. A corollary proposition is that, if prices
are different from marginal costs, inefficiency will result.
[Ref. 12: p. 27]
If, as is the case with AUTOVON, there are some fixed
costs of operation and a requirement that all costs be
covered by revenues generated, the marginal cost principle
enunciated above must be modified. The cost per unit of
service should still be the marginal cost, but the fixed
costs should be recovered by an entry fee that is indepen-
dent of use. Thus the pricing system would have two compo-
nents: a fixed charge for the right to use the system and a
charge that varies with usage and with the indices of usage
which are related to costs (e.g., number and duration of
calls, distance called, time of day). Generally, the appli-
cation of marginal cost pricing principles is referred to as
usage-sensitive pricing. [fief. 12: p. 27]
C. USAGE-SENSITIVE PRICING IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR
The United States and Canada are among the few major
countries that use flat-rate pricing for local service.
There are some 170 million telephones outside the United
States; approximately 9 1% of these are measured. Local call
timing is practiced in England, Spain, and Japan. Most of
the rest of Continental Europe charges on a basis of one
message unit per call. The concept of US? is not new to the
United States. After World War I, message registers, which
recorded the number of calls, were provide! in central
offices. Subscriber billing was calculated on a per call
basis- In the 20* s, instruments were in service in Everett,
Washington, which measured not only the number of calls, but
also the holding time of the call. Such instruments record
the time within 15 seconds. A special clock was used which
allowed the lengthening of the increments to 2 minutes in
order that a peak-type pricing scheme could be used. As
early as 1908, the Rochester Telephone Company was inter-
ested in recording telephone service on an elapsed time
basis. One can go tack even further and find that the work
on developing metering devices was done in the 1880's;
however, because of competition between the growing Bell
system and independent companies during this period, the
offering of a metering service was avoided. [Ref. 15: pp.
6-7]
There has been a new surge in interest over the last
decade due to inflation, increased local usage, and competi-
tion from independent firms that sell telephone equipment
and supply private tell lines to business customers. Since
World Par II, technological advances have benefited long
distance far more than local telephone calling.
Developments in microwave communications, coaxial cable,
satellites, and waveguides have dramatically lowered the
costs of long distance transmission. In contrast, the costs
of local service have moved upward since the late 1960s.
Faced with a continuing stream of requests for local tele-
phone rate increases, state regulatory commissions are
finding the concept of tying prices to usage increasingly
attractive. [Ref. 16: p. 1]
Emerging competition in the telephone industry has
brought into question all aspects of the established carri-
ers' pricing policies. Historically, regulatory bodies nave
allowed long distance rates to exceed costs; the resulting
surplus has been used to subsidize local exchange rates
through the accounting procedures for "separating" toll
revenues between state and interstate calling. Now, under
the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) policy of
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encouraging competition/ the growth of specialized common
carriers who supply long distance services to large
customers is generating pressures to establish cost based
rates. In opening its inguiry into the effects of competi-
tion, the FCC noted [Bef. 16: p- 2] :
"...the public interest might better be served by
converting from flat rate, cost insensitive exchange
service pricing to measure rate or cost-related pricing
in order to prevent any unwarranted losses in intrastate
revenue requirements from (competition) .
"
It has been an AT&T policy since the mid-7 O's to phase
out flat-rate telephone service. During that time period
AT&T Chairman, John deButts, was quoted as saying [Bef. 15:
p. 5] :
"We are moving more and more into the direction of
usage-sentive pricing, meaning the more a customer uses
his phone, the more he pays. A±ST hopes to phase out
completely flat-rate telephone sarvice and begin making
individual charges for calls from all home phones."
In more and more states, measured service is becoming manda-
tory for business subscribers and available at least option-
ally to residential subscribers. California now reguires
DSP for businesses in large cities. The state also has
adopted a special "lifeline" service for residential
subscribers. The service offers a lower monthly rental than
flat-rate service, a number of free local calls each month,
and a charge for each additional local call. In Illinois,
General Telephone has begun field trials of msasured resi-
dential service in several local exchanges, and regulatory
commissions have approved mandatory use of measured service
in Chicago and New York. [Ref. 16: pp. 2-3]
Discussion of civilian practices are not necessarily
relevant to the unique aspects of the military environment,
however data that has been developed through mathematical
modeling may prove helpful in showing what results might be
expected if DCA were to go to a similar system. Without
going into the actual methodology used, Table XX illustrates
what the effect on number of calls and cost would be when
changing from a flat rate to a measured pricing policy. "L"
is the monthly fee charged for access and "p" is the charge
per call. Several points can be made. It is seen that as a
shift is made from flat- rate to US?, the number of subscri-
bers increase. This would not be a factor for the DCS since
all agencies requiring access to a given system are already
subscribers regardless of cost. The significant elements
have to do with number of calls and cost, both of which
decrease. Note that the lowest values for each of these
factors occurs when the monthly access fee is the lowest and
price per call is the highest. Though there are many
distinctions between the civilian and military systems, this
data at least provides some insight into what the potential
ramifications of moving to G*SP might be. [Ref. 16: p. 31]
D. USAGE-SENSITIVE PfilCING IN THE MILITARY
In order to institute USP practices in the DCS, each
system would have to be looked at separately in order to
determine the major components of costs and how these costs
should be allocated. For AUTOVON there are three primary
cost generating factors: access, usage and precedence.
Usage refers to distance and length of a given call.
[Ref. 12: p. 12] Much time has been spent in determining how
best to implement this new policy. The methodology is too
extensive to describe here and no data is currently avail-
able to indicate how effective it will be. Beginning in
7Y86 a two year study will start for the purpose of
collecting such data. The European Telephone System will be
used to determine its significance to voice systems. DDN
will be used for message systems.
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Usage-sensitive pricing has four basic objectives
[Ref. 12: p. 67] :
(1) To induce subscribers to choose the number of access
lines and precedence that best suits their traffic
requirements.
(2) To provide incentives for efficient use of the system.
(3) To allocate the costs of the system to the agencies
that use it; the billing should also provide informa-
tion that will permit agencies, if they wish, to shift
the costs to or impose controls or regulations on the
individuals or agency subdivisions doing the calling.
(4) To provide reliable information to the supplier of the
service upon which to base decisions about how much
capacity is required.
The following observations indicate how usage-sensitive
pricing can be expected to aid in the achievement of these
four objectives. They have been taken from reference 12,
pages 68 through 70.
(a) If the monthly backbone charge is very low and nearly
ail reveneues are collected through usage charges, the
number and mix of access lines will be more nearly
optimal than if connectivity fees are high. At
present, users must pay the same amount whether they
use a line heavily or very little. Deciding to add
one more line requires budgeting a significant amount
of money. As a result, they are more likaly to accept
a higher level of congestion before acquiring a new
access line than they would if access costs were near
zero and revenues were collected for usage. In addi-
tion, if usage charges were instituted, the rationale
for differential charges for two-way and one-way lines
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would disappear. Selection of the proper mix of lines
then would be based upon the technical requirements of
the user rather than artificial price differences.
The resource cost of adding a line would be paid
through access fees. The cost of using it would be
paid through usage charges.
(b) Charging for usage on the basis of distance, holding
time and precedence would allocate costs efficiently
to each user agency. Adjustments to the present
charging system would make it possible to allocate the
total costs of a particular category of service, e.g.,
CONUS, to the entire group of subscribers using that
service. Subscribers would still not be paying their
share, however. Only usage charges will permit allo-
cation of costs properly to individual agencies or
individual lines. Usage charges would also permit
agencies to impose valid controls or restraints on
callers. With the current charging system there is
little justification or incentive to do so.
(c) Charging for usage would provide incentives for
callers to make fewer ana shorter calls, thus reducing
congestion costs and possibly reducing backbone costs.
The degree to which such a result might be expected
depends, of course, upon the policies user agencies
follow in response to the bills it would receive from
DCA.
(d) If user charges are zero and all revenues are
collected through connectivity fees, the service
supplier has imperfect information upon which to base
decisions on the amount of capacity to provide. If
there is congestion, it derives from calls that would
not be attempted if they were properly charged for.
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If there is no congestion with zero user fees, there
is almost surely excess capacity. Thus, the level of
congestion is not a valid standard against which to
measure the adequacy of capacity. This point has
little relevance for the overseas network where
capacity is fixed and independent of congestion. In
CONUS, however, capacity is adjusted on the basis of a
target level of congestion. But this target level is
arbitrary and has no relation to an optimum grade of
service. If user charges were instituted, the grade
of service would be a more meaningful indicator of
congestion costs.
(e) When user charges are zero, total costs, including
congestions costs, will exceed the total costs
incurred when appropriate usage charges are insti-
tuted. The real cost of supplying a given quantity of
service is virtually fixed, but as the price per call
charged the user falls below the marginal cost, more
low valued calls will be attempted and the congestion
costs imposed upon all callers, particularly those
with high valued calls, will increase.
(f) The existence of precedence capability reduces the
cost of congestion by assuring that high valued calls
are successfully placed. It introduces another cost,
however, that is imposed upon those whose conversa-
tions are interrupted. The introduction of usage
charges for precedence calls would allow the direct
costs of precedence calls and the indirect cost of
interruptions tc be allocated to callers not just on
the basis of capability but also as a function of how
many high precedence calls they make. Charging for
precedence calls would provide an incentive to select
lower precedence for calls of lower value.
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(g) Charging for usage would permit the costs of overseas
calls to be allocated to overseas users, regardless of
precedence. With the current price structure, most of
the cost of providing overseas service is collected
through precedence charges. Osage charges based on
time and distance would not only allocate costs
correctly to individual users, but would lead to
better allocations of overseas trunk capacity. It
would also provide a basis for judging whether that
capacity is adequate.
(h) In imposing usage charges, OCA could (a) improve the
efficiency of cost allocation, (b) influence agencies
in their choice of numbers and kinds of access lines,
(c) affect only indirectly the behavior of callers.
DCA's responsibility is limited to the backbone
portion of AUTOVON. It has virtually no control over
any activities outside the backbone. Thus, its
pricing policies directly affect only the decisions
made at the agency level. Effects upon caller
behavior would depend upon agency response to the
prices they face. The agencies could use discipline
or budgetory procedurs to influence callers if they
wished to do so.
(i) Preliminary estimates of the pec minute charges that
would cover the cost of calls within C3NUS indicate
that the user fees required would be considerably
below those for the Federal Telecommunications System
(FTS) and commercial services. For example, the esti-
mated charge per minute for a call of greater than
1,000 miles is 11.1 cents; that recommended for FTS in
a recent study done for GSA was 23.9 cents.
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E. PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION
If USP is able to accomplish all it is hoped it will,
the difficulties in changing over will be well worth the
effort. There are definitely problems associated with such
a change. ne major area of concern is costs. If in
executing USP total costs of operations increase, any
benefits derived are incidental. DCA cannot order depart-
ments and agencies to accept the change to USP. In order
for it to be effective, all concerned must be convinced of
its advantages. If the result of charging for use is an
increase in payments to the CSIF, it would be hard to
justify to customers and Congress that any benefits were
worth it. Cost increases would be due primarily to the
extra eguipment required for measuring usage. How this
additional equipment will effect total costs, in concert
with any cost reduction as a result of a decline in usage,
is one form of information the two year study will hopefully
provide.
Another area that should be of some concern is what
impact this will have on the planning and budgeting process.
Several points have been discussed regarding the difficul-
ties involved in forecasting access line usage. Imagine
trying to estimate the number of calls in the case of
AUTOVON, or the number of messages for AUTODIN. In fact one
suggestion has been to charge based on lines of message so
that costs are more accurately distributed to those who
write lengthy messages. Over time a pattern would undoubt-
edly emerge to aid in these estimates but in the intervening
years, the disruption to OSM funding would be tremendous.
Following on from the preceding discussion is how effec-
tive USP can actually be in meeting the objectives listed in
Section D. In order for such a pricing policy to motivate
users in the manner desired, the users must be directly
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effected by any changes. The underlying assumption of JS?
is that when confronted by a charge for every call or every
message, the users will alter their behavior to reflect
this. The problem arises due to how the DCS is actually
funded within the various services and agencies. Throughout
this thesis vhen referring to the user or the customer, this
has not been a reference to every single entity connected to
the system down to the lowest level. Planning and budgeting
are centrally done at COMNAVTELCOH for the Navy. All O&M
funds for the DCS are also maintained at this level. What
this means is that in charging based on usage as opposed to
access line connections, the only level within the service
that will actually feel the effect directly is COMNAVTSLCCK
.
Unless new policies and enforcement procedures are imple-
mented by those in charge, the individual command will
perceive no difference between the current and proposed
method of pricing. The incentive structure of iJSP alone
does not extend that far. Major departments may not view
the increased administrative difficulties in a favorable
light, but without them the effectiveness of USP is lost.
The two year study will allow activities the time to deter-
mine how stringent enforcement must be and the best way to
implement any new procedures.
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TABLE XIX
Funding Changes For Military Personnel
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Data On Usage-Sensitive Pricing
CHANGES IN NUMBER OF SUBSCRIBERS, CALLING RATES, AND
MONTHLY BILLS UNDER TWO-PART TARIFFS
Measured Rate
Flat Rate Alternative I Alternative II
(L - $5.50, (L - $3.00, (L = $2.00
Item p - Oc) P - 2c) p = 3c)
Average-Income Households (X « 1.0)
Calls per subscriber per month
For original subscribers:
Calls per subscriber per month
Monthly bill
For new subscribers:
Calls per subscriber per month
Monthly bill
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71. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCIDSIOHS
The main thrust of this thesis has been to analyze the
effect that the current policies of the CSIF have had on the
ability of the DCA to influence the design of the DCS. The
major area of interest has been the discrepancies between
vhat the DCA is attempting to accomplish and the behavior
elicited from the incentives created by present fund mecha-
nisms. Management difficulties extending from the complex
array of players involved in decision making have been exam-
ined along with issues relating to budgeting and planning
procedures, and the availability of accurate information for
determining the most beneficial course of action. A summary
of the principal conclusions, reached is provided below.
1 . Management Issues
There are two primary facets of current fund prac-
tices which preclude effective management: current methods
of financing capital and government-owned equipment and the
division of responsibility and authority. The division of
responsibility and authority prevents the consolidation of
requirements in the broad context of the system as a whole.
DCA has no authority beyond the backbone portions of the
networks, with decisions a s to access lines and terminal
equipment remaining the province of the users. Fund
activity is dependent on budgeted OSM appropriations from
each user which requires DCA to accomplish its planning and
programming with no identifiable fiscal target, dealing with
fragmented cost data across departmental lines. Individual
departments naturally view their needs above those of the
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aggregate which disrupts planning, budgeting and justifica-
tion of the total structure.
The present method of financing capital and
government-owned assets by purchasing them through desig-
nated services 1 procurement appropriations results in
several deficiencies. Lease versus bay flexibility is
restricted virtually locking in the decision once it is
made. Since these costs are not distributed to all users of
the service, the true cost of providing such services is
hidden. This interferes with accurate analyses for lease
versus buy decisions and consideration of alternative
services, plus places the burden of budgeting for and justi-
fication of such services on only a few of the users.
A consolidated communications system cannot operate
effectively when the major functions of planning, budgeting
and program justification are decentralized. A mechanism
for more extensive coordination and a single focal point for
system justification is reguired.
2 - Allocative Efficiency.
The current incentive structure, created by charging
for the backbone network based on weighted units assigned to
access line characteristics, has not been successful in
influencing optimum capacity or mix of lines or in control-
ling congestion. Characteristics chosen are not necessarily
indicative of the cost creating features of the system and
the assumptions underlying weighted unit assignment are not
always valid.
Though the concept of industrial funding has as its
central feature that "buyers 1 pay for what they use, thereby
causing them to consider their needs against costs, present
CSIF policies undermine this objective. By paying for back-
bone costs based on access lines, actual use of the system
is still perceived as being free. There is nothing to
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encourage a user to consider the value of an individual call
or message placed into the system. This is intensified by
the fact that all OS 'A money appropriated for DCS payments is
kept at the C0MN1VTEXC0M level, insulating all lower level





Several alternatives to current CSIF practices were
described and analyzed in Chapters IV and V. The value of
each has been discussed and will not be repeated here. Any
changes considered must address both the management concerns
and incentive inadeguacies. A solution to one does not
automatically include the other. From those alternatives
previously enumerated, the following recommendations are
offered for consideration.
(1) Total authority and responsibility for the DCS should
be consolidated under DCA. This includes financing of
all capital equipment and final decisions on number
and type of access lines added and terminal equipment
attached.
(2) The first recommendation by itself will not have an
effect on congestion ani therefore required capacity.
Some form of usage-sensitive pricing should be incor-
porated into pricing policies.
(3) Operation and Maintenance funds designated for DCS
telecommunications services should be distributed by
CCMNAVTS1COM to the subordinate levels.
3y requiring final approval on system attachments by
DCA, a coordination mechanism is added to the system which
was previously lacking. When dealing with a system which is
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of the magnitude of the DCS, a single point of authority is
needed which can view the development outside the realm of
partisanship. Financing capital and government- owned equip-
ment through the CSIF allows for distribution of costs
through the regular reimbursement cycle. Inflexibilities of
the system are reduced and DCA becomes the single organiza-
tion responsible for justifying system changes. By
financing all assets through the CSIF, such justification is
made easier with more accurate cost data and economic anal-
yses .
Civilian studies have indicated that usage-sensitive
pricing has the potential for modifying user behavior in a
manner beneficial to the system. Charging for use forces
consumers to evaluate their actions each time the system is
used. Studies propose that the result will be a reduction
in total usage which will effect congestion and subsequently
required system capacity. Charging based on use will at
least offer a more realistic estimate of what the optimum
capacity of the system is.
Since D&M funds are currently maintained by
C0HNAVTE1C0M, moving to usage-sensitive pricing will have
limited influence on lower level subscribers unless changes
are initiated in internal procedures. Numerous revisions to
the present method could be outlined, however, the most
effective as far as cringing the incentives closer to all
users would be to filter O&M funds down to the lowest level.
This will not , of course, solve the problem of what to do
about the individual user. The primary area of concern in
upcoming years, will probably center on this aspect of moni-
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